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Dramatic changes in Presidential and Congressional
approaches to the knotted issues of coalitions have evolved
over the past half century. Once bound by strong isolationist
policies, American leaders now attempt to build not only
military coalitions for warfare, but also political and
economic coalitions for ideological and burden-sharing
reasons. American foreign policy, however, gets its direction
from two sources. The President, seen by many as the leader of
American foreign policy, influences policy in a realistic
direction. He is the national leader of the United States, and
carries a unity of purpose and influence into office. He can
speak and act on the world stage with a global manner,
unhindered by local interests and commitments. As such, the
President has more embraced raison d'etat than has the
Congress. Congress, on the other hand, directs foreign policy
from a more idealist, even populist perspective. Responsible
for the budget and "paying the bills", Congress has
obligations as a representative of a state or community. Thus,
although Congress must likewise pursue a national policy, it
is compelled to support the homefront by bringing dollars and
jobs to local citizens. To Congress, all politics are local
politics. Sometimes, as in the face of a perceived threat, the
two views converge, and American foreign policy pursues a
straight and coherent course. Often, however, the two branches
of government clash in their vision of the direction of
foreign policy.
In the past, American leaders have abhorred alliances and
coalitions. From President Washington's farewell address
warning in 1799 of "no entangling alliances" to the
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in 1949, the reluctance to enter into alliances and coalitions
had characterized American foreign policy. Yet events
following the Second World War marked a substantial change in
U.S. foreign policy. The Executive branch, with Legislative
branch approval, entered into alliances and coalitions for the
reasons of collective security and global stability. For the
first time, the United States, under Presidential urging,
became entangled in peacetime military alliances with nations
overseas .
Most important was the role the U.S. Congress played vis-
a-vis the President in directing foreign policy. Congress sees
itself as more than merely a "watchdog" of the Executive
branch. In the Senate's capacity to "advise and consent" with
the president on entering into treaties with other nations,
their power to approve or dismiss the treaty is absolute.
Congress demonstrated its influence by not only supporting the
President in two major wartime coalitions, the First and
Second World Wars, but also in the ensuing peacetime
coalitions, such as NATO.
The Congress, however, did not provide a rubber stamp to
the Executive branch's actions. As the following chapters
suggest, since 1945, the voice of Congress has been
significant in deciding and curtailing the Executive's policy.
Congress has specifically raised the burden -sharing issue
regarding coalitions. Burden-sharing has come to mean the
desire to share the costs of manpower and resources dedicated
to military coalitions. Therefore, since Congress controls the
purse strings of the government, it can use that power
effectively to limit the goals of the President.
Nevertheless, Congress by and large is supportive of
Executive foreign policy. Why has Congress acceded to
Executive desires to enter into alliances? Although
Congressional support has varied since the end of World War II
and the beginning of U.S. peacetime coalitions, external
events have been critically important to that backing. This
thesis will suggest that the extent of Congressional support
for the coalitions is vitally dependent upon the perceived
external threat. For example, when the external threat is
perceived high, Congress tends to abide by Presidential
decisions. Fear of a Communist invasion of Europe following
the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia spurred Congress to adopt the
Vandenberg Resolution, supporting collective security in
Europe, and ultimately to adopt the North Atlantic Treaty in
1949. When the external threat has diminished, the Congress
takes a more assertive role towards Presidential adventurism.
Presidential "imperialism", the stagnating war in Vietnam, and
the continuing burden of troops in Europe sparked
Congressional activism in the late 1960s under the Mansfield
Amendments to cut U.S. troop numbers overseas.
The reasons for Congressional intervention are many. By
attacking Presidential power, Congress can hope to increase
its own power at the expense of the executive Branch.
Likewise, as the keeper of the purse, Congress is concerned
with burden-sharing issues. These two factors alone provide
impetus enough to challenge presidential foreign policy.
Combined, the factors provide the basis for Congressional
activism against the degree of U.S. involvement in coalitions.
Furthermore, the American approach to coalition warfare is
unique. While Americans traditionally seek other nations to
aid in sharing the military risk and burden, American leaders
are hesitant to seek "too much" assistance. Having equal
partners to share the burden would mean relinquishing control
of the coalition's directions. Thus, by always sustaining the
heaviest burden and enduring the greatest risk, the United
States ensures that it will have the dominant voice in a
coalition's foreign policy.
This thesis examines the past U.S. approaches to
coalitions and efforts to forge alliances in peace and war,
and reflects on the relevance of this record for makers of
U.S. policy of today and tomorrow. America's entry into the
Great War in 1917 marked the beginning of that effort to forge
alliances. It was the end of a century and a half of
isolationism. Yet the United States was the junior partner in
the First World War, and dissatisfaction over wartime and
postwar settlements left American leaders bitter and
apathetic. America retreated back to isolationism.
The lessons of World War I played important roles in
America's next great coalition. The U.S. found itself the
senior partner in the Second World War, determined to direct
alliance policy. The United States shouldered a majority of
the burden, and thus decided coalition goals.
America remained an active international player following
World War II. External threats-- the Greek Civil War, the
Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin Blockade -- drove Congress to
support Presidential actions to establish a peacetime
coalition. The Vandenberg Resolution (1948) and NATO
exemplified strong Congressional leadership and backing of
executive policy. The Korean war likewise provided the impetus
for Truman's capstone of alliance policy in sending U.S.
troops to Europe. Although Congress, in the Great Debate of
1951, challenged Truman's ability to deploy American troops
overseas, its acquiescence signalled agreement with the
administration's alliance-oriented policy.
Congressional activism, however, rose during the late s
and began to peak by 1966. Strengthened european powers, a
weak dollar, and the continued burden of overseas troops led to
the Mansfield Amendments, challenges to executive authority to
deploy troops abroad. The decrease in external threats and
weakening American economy compelled Congress to confront the
President on the burden-sharing issue. Likewise, the Iran
Contra affair in the early 1980s demonstrated a coalition
gone awry. With no distinct threat, Congress ceased funding
of the Contra movement. Covert Administration operations
illegally attempted to circumvent the congressional mandate to
end the coalition.
Operation Desert Storm represents a shift in the
traditional roles of the President and Congress. This time,
the President enacted the call for increased burden-sharing,
effectively preempting Congress. Simultaneously, Congress
demonstrated its increased stature in foreign affairs by
challenging both the executive branch and overseas governments
on burden-sharing and coalition guidance.
The tension between the executive and legislative branches
is inherent to American government. Each branch jealously
guards its power base, and challenges the other to maintain
that power. In coalition and alliance policy, burden-sharing
is the venue for such challenges.
Congressional and Presidential confrontation is an
important aspect of American foreign policy. Both branches
have a strong desire to decide the direction of U.S. policy,
and the influence both branches have upon the other is the
largest factor in the unsteady course of American coalitions.
By examining the above cases of the struggle to build American
coalitions, one better understand today's current events as
well as decide the events of tomorrow.
II. EARLY COALITIONS
A. WORLD WAR ONE
Prior to 1917, national leaders and the public alike
abhorred the idea of coalition war. Nothing outside of
America's borders seemed threatening enough to risk
involvement in European alliances or wars. In fact, short of
the alliance with France during the American Revolutionary
War, American leaders prided themselves on their ability not
to involve the United States in "messy" European affairs.
World War One changed American thinking. America's entry
into the Great War in 1917 marked the end of a century and a
half of non-participation in "entangling alliances". By
deciding to take part in coalition war, many in the United
States saw it as a way to prevent having to enter such wartime
coalitions in the future. By acting decisively to defeat the
Central Powers in "the War to end all Wars", optimists in the
United States hoped to establish a New World Order of
stability and peace.
The United States was the junior partner in its first
coalition. Yet the allies, Britain and France, recognized the
importance of cooperating with the United States for both the
successful completion of the war and the securing of the peace
afterwards. The Europeans could not help but acknowledge the
influence that a young and powerful America could wield on the
international scene. Also, President Wilson entered the war
with idealistic dreams and visions. In a choice between
totalitarian Germany and a free Britain and France, the United
States was making the world safe for democracy. The war, in
fact, emerged as the vehicle for establishing the peaceful
civilization of which Wilson dreamed. 1 Wilson's Fourteen
Points would be the basis for World peace and stability.
Furthermore, he hoped, the League of Nations would deter
further war since the might of all nations would act against
any aggressor.
President Wilson, however, did not include Congress in his
negotiations and dreams; the League of Nations failed
ratification of the Senate. Leaders in the Senate, such as
Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) , saw entry into any international
agreements as detrimental to U.S. national interest. 2 In fact,
disillusionment in 1919 over the postwar settlement ran
rampant. Conservative Republicans, led by Lodge, rebelled
against Wilson's League. Lodge was willing to support the
Treaty, provided certain amendments were made that did not
automatically drag the U.S. into conflict. Meanwhile, with
Lodge acting as a moderator, fiery isolationists, led by
1 Eliot Asinof, 1919: America's Loss of Innocence (New
York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1990), p. 83.
2 Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A Realist
Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (Wilmington, DE : Scholarly
resources Inc., 1984), p. xix.
Senators William E. Borah (R-ID) and Hiram Johnson (R-CA) saw
their opportunity to crush the League Treaty. They toured the
48 states, speaking vehemently against Wilson's League. Termed
the " Irreconcilables " , the Senators set out to battle a
President at the peak of his power. 3
America was not ready for a peacetime alliance, and the
Senate sensed that. Allied domination of the war and postwar
leadership irritated Congressional leaders. Moreover, as the
junior member of the coalition, the United States was not
privy to many of the secret negotiations between Britain and
France for the postwar settlement. Congress resented being
left out of the greater peace settlement. Finally, the
democratic ideals and goals of which Wilson spoke when taking
the nation to war failed to materialize after the war. To
many, involvement in the Great War had been of no benefit to
the United States. The Senate reflected popular opinion in
rejecting the Versailles Treaty.
America retreated into isolationism. To the Congress, no
real threat loomed on the horizon. The absence of any external
threat solidified their belief not to act internationally.
Wilson had offered the Congress only two choices: avid
internationalism or its antithesis in isolationism.
Furthermore, as the junior partner, the U.S. was unable to
substantially influence the other members of the alliance.
3 Selig Adler, Uncertain Giant (New York: Macmillan
Company, 19 65), p. 11.
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Although unrivaled in power, the United States did not make
that power felt among the European nations. The general
bitterness and antipathy towards coalitions fueled an America
to turn inward.
B. WORLD WAR TWO
The reluctance to enter alliances and the bitterness
following the First World war played important roles in
America's next great coalition. Prior to U.S. involvement in
World War II, President Roosevelt recognized the part America
must play in any future conflict, and specifically in the one
evolving in Europe and the Pacific. For some of the same
reasons (democracy, free trade) as Wilson, Roosevelt provided
aid to the allies through a series of ingenious aid packages.
Linkage to the allies was not easy, especially with an
isolationist Congress and reluctant public. For example, in
the summer of 1939, Senator Key Pittman (D-NV) , an advocate
for the Roosevelt Administration, tried to modify the
neutrality acts by extending the cash-and-carry policy past a
May 1, 1939 deadline. Isolationists in the Congress had pitted
their policy to the neutrality acts; they vowed to maintain a
policy of "enforced neutrality". Opposition to Pittman's
proposal was so strong that Pittman could not bring the
11
resolution out of committee. The House proved no better friend
to Roosevelt . 4
By now, however, Roosevelt and Congress recognized the
weight that America carried on the international scene. No
longer a junior member, American military and economic might
dictated that the United States be more that just an equal in
any coalition they entered. Months before the attack on Pearl
Harbor, Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter.
Although Anglo-American in its principles, it was an American
idea. The Charter linked the United States to the British, and
envisioned the triumph of democracy and self determination in
the postwar world. Most important, it dictated the emergence
of the United States as an active international player. 5
Once involved in the War, the United States took the lead
in the coalition. Although the allies, especially Great
Britain, still possessed a significant voice in the wartime
decisions, the U.S., as the strongest nation economically and
militarily, dictated the direction that the coalition would
take. America, shouldering the majority of the burden, could
decide coalition goals.
4 Graebner, p. 57. Pittman's measure was finally rejected
on July 11. Roosevelt bitterly stated that "the administration
should 'introduce a bill for statues of [Senators] Austin,
Vandenberg, Lodge, and Taft...to be erected in Berlin and put
the swastika on them. '
"
Adler, p. 258. The Charter was to "join the Fourteen
Points on the scrap heap of forgotten pledges," but it did
signal a presidential conclusion that eventually the United
States would have to enter the war.
12
Following the war, only the United States was in a
position economically and militarily to take the lead on the
international scene. And, luckily enough for the
administration, a new threat -- Communism-- had emerged
against which to focus America's might. Roosevelt had promised
two days after the Pearl Harbor attack that "we are going to
win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows."
By being the dominant member of the Alliance, Roosevelt,
unlike Wilson, could ensure that postwar settlements were in
the U.S. national interests. 6
C. NATO-- PEACETIME COALITION
America emerged more than ever the dominant power
following the Second World War. As after World War I, only the
United States was unscathed from the aftermath of the war.
Determined to take positive steps to prevent another world
war, both the President and Congress acted to establish
European recovery and security under U.S. auspices. The
ultimate result was a peacetime military coalition-- the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
.
On April 4, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson signed
the North Atlantic Treaty, the first peacetime military
6 Wilson, in fact, never acted on behalf of U.S. national
interest. Instead, Wilson acted for greater mankind and other
lofty goals. Roosevelt's realism and dedication to advancing
U.S. national interests, while simultaneously advancing lofty




alliance entered into by the United States. It was the
culmination of Truman's foreign policy towards Europe. NATO,
a collective defense organization, combined with the Marshall
Plan for European economic recovery, and the Military
Assistance Plan, for military restoration, was one of the legs
in Truman's triad to combat communist aggression in Europe.
Entrance into an "entangling alliance" was not an
overwhelmingly popular move. Resistance in the Senate, led by
hardline Republicans such as Robert A. Taft (R-OH) , reflected
popular concerns of American involvement in Europe's
problems. 7 Communism and the Soviet Union provided the
necessary enemy to overcome popular reluctance to alliances
and a desire for a return to isolationism.
NATO found its roots in early 1948 in the Brussels Treaty,
a collective security pact between Britain, France, Belgium,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. At the same time that the
Brussels signatories were aligning themselves, Truman was
placing his European Recovery Programs before Congress.
External events provided a blessing to the administration: on
February 25, 1948, Czechoslovakia fell under a coup to
Communist dictatorship. Communist aggression, combined with
the support of key bipartisan senators, ensured the approval
in Congress of the European Recovery Programs (the Marshall
Plan). Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), Chairman of the
7 Phil Williams, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 11.
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was a key reason behind
passage of many of Truman's plans. He recognized the
importance of a strong and healthy Europe, and in bi-partisan
negotiations with his Democratic counterpart Senator Tom
Connally (D-TX) , skillfully steered ambitious foreign policy
matters through the Senate.
British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin mentioned the
Brussels negotiations to Secretary of State Marshall in early
1948. Marshall then sent Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett
to the Senate for "exploratory" conversations with Vandenberg
and Connally. 8 The product of the talks was Senate Resolution
239, the Vandenberg Resolution. Approved by the Senate on June
11, 1948, the Vandenberg Resolution recognized that Europe,
still recovering from the devastation of the War, was unable
to stand against the Communists alone. As such, the resolution
urged the United States to develop self defense coalitions
"with such regional and other collective arrangements as are
based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." 9
Vandenberg was able to push through the resolution urging
"mutual-aid" for many reasons. First, it highlighted the
important role of the Senate in treaty and coalition building.
8 Colin Gordon, "NATO and Larger European States" in NATO
after Thirty Years , ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W.
Clawson (Wilmington, DE : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), p.
60.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record , 80th
Cong., 2d sess., June 11, 1948, p. 7791.
15
President Truman was unable to launch into a mutual defense
pact without first sending Marshall to consult with Congress.
Second, Vandenberg, Connally, and the Administration employed
a true bi-partisan approach to the problem, thus increasing
the possibility of passage from both parties in the Senate.
Finally, Vandenberg 's resolution was only a "small" step
towards a defensive coalition. The Administration had
approached Vandenberg in 1948 to obtain his support for a
treaty with Western Europe; Vandenberg warned the
Administration about moving too fast. 10 Thus, as Phil
Williams observes, the Senate Resolution "may have paved the
way for a security treaty with Western Europe 1949, but it was
also a substitute for such a treaty in 1948". n
The Vandenberg Resolution was enough to nurture the idea
of an association between the United States and the
signatories of the Brussels Treaty. Yet the Vandenberg
Resolution was far from an alliance with Europe. The
Administration, recognizing the influence of isolationists in
both the Congress and the public, needed a catalyst to drive
the United States into a peacetime alliance. Again, Soviet
actions provided impetus. In the summer of 1948, the Soviets
blockaded Berlin, cutting the city off from Western nations
10 Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and
the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 19.
11 Williams, p. 12 .
16
and supplies. At the height of the Crisis, the State
Department initiated talks with the Brussels Pact Powers. 12
Undersecretary Lovett met with his European counterparts
in Washington to discuss a peacetime coalition. The European
view was that although the Marshall Plan had helped the
Europeans substantially, "the constant threat of unpredictable
Soviet moves resulted in an atmosphere of insecurity and fear
among the peoples of Western Europe." 13 The U.S. would have
to join in a security pact to dispel the fears that the Soviet
Army could overrun the continent.
The Brussels Pact nations then raised the most
controversial element of the proposed Treaty. They wanted the
pact to state that "if a member was attacked, the other
members would supply all the military and other aid and
assistance in their power." 14 This was the entangling
alliance that Congress feared. Canada proposed a compromise,
suggesting that in case of attack on one member, it was to be
seen as an attack on all members. Thus, the national right of
each country was not infringed upon. The Canadian proposal
12 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope






provided an escape for the U.S. Congress; the compromise
became Article V of the Treaty. 15
Unlike Wilson's debacle with the League Treaty, the Truman
Administration recognized the importance of working carefully
with Congress over the proposed Treaty. Of all the
"entangling" dilemmas, Congress saw three primary issues in
the Treaty: the possibility of U.S. troops deployed to Europe,
the substance of a European-American Treaty, and the
requirement for European self-help. 16 Truman obviously
wanted the Treaty passed, but feared that to place it before
the Senate as a fait accompli would destine it to a death like
the League of Nations. Newly appointed Secretary of State Dean
Acheson was given the formidable task of presenting and
pushing the Treaty through the Senate.
Acheson 's first goal was to win over Senators Vandenberg
and Connally. The Administration realized that consultation
with the Senate on the North Atlantic Pact was a prerequisite
15 Article V of the Treaty states: "The Parties agree that
an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and
consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each
of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security
of the North Atlantic area." From "North Atlantic Treaty",
quoted in NATO and the Policy of Containment , ed. Lawrence S.
Kaplan (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1968), p. 13.
16 Williams
, p . 13
.
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for its later "consent". The Secretary of State met with the
Committee on Foreign Relations to work out differences. 17
After numerous changes to the working of the articles,
particularly to the "constitutional processes" of Article V,
the Treaty was ready for public hearings.
The factors in obtaining Senate support of the
Administration's goals were many. First, as mentioned above,
inclusion of the Senate in the negotiation and revision of the
Treaty built support for passage. Second, many Senators, such
as Vandenberg and Connally, simply saw it as logical action
upon the Vandenberg Resolution. Third, proponents of the
Treaty saw it as providing a serious deterrent to the
Soviets. 18
A North Atlantic Alliance still embodied an "entangling"
problem for Congressmen; ratification was not a foregone
conclusion. The fears of Congress in enacting an alliance
17 H. Bradford Waterfield, Foreign Policy and Party
Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (New York: Octagon Books,
1972), p. 331. Vandenberg and Connally were consulted almost
daily until the draft was finished.
18 Peter Foote, "America and the Origins of the Atlantic
Alliance: A Reappraisal," in The Origins of NATO , ed. Joseph
Smith (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), p. 82.
Vandenberg stated that the treaty was "notification to Mr.
Stalin which puts him in exactly the contrary position to that
which Mr. Hitler was in, because Mr. Hitler saw us with a
Neutrality Act. Mr. Stalin sees us with a pact of cooperative
action." See The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic
Treaty: Meetings Held in Executive Session before the
Committee on Foreign relations, United States Senate,
Eightieth Congress, second session on S. Res 239 , Historical
Series (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), p.
158.
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treaty were put to the test. On the one hand, the North
Atlantic Treaty seemed to fulfill Senate desires to have
Europe begin its own self-help program. With the North
Atlantic Pact as a logical extension of the Marshall Plan,
eventually the European nations would be able to economically
and militarily defend themselves. Most important, however, was
the Senate belief that the defense pact (like the Marshall
Plan) involved U.S. aid in material only. According to
testimony, no ground troops were to be sent to Europe. In
Committee Hearings for the North Atlantic Treaty, Senator
Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) summed up Congressional feeling:
HICKENLOOPER: I am interested in getting the answers as to
whether or not we are expected to supply substantial
numbers- by that I do not mean a thousand or two, or 500,
or anything of that kind, but very substantial numbers- of
troops and troop organizations, of American troops, to
supplement the land power of Western Europe to
aggression Are we going to be expected to send
substantial number of troops over there as a more or less
permanent contribution to the development of these
countries' capacity to resist?
Acheson: The answer to that question, Senator is a clear
and absolute "no". 19
Finally, Congress was assured that the Treaty in no way
infringed upon the national sovereignty of the United States.
Truman had instructed the negotiators from the beginning to
reword Article V so as not to drag the U.S. automatically into
war. 20 Furthermore, the Committee on Foreign Relations report
19 The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic
Treaty
, p. 99.
20 Truman, p. 24 9
.
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asserted that the Treaty in no way impaired the rights of the
Congress. The Treaty did not affect the constitutional power
of either the Executive or Legislative branches, nor did it
change the relationship between them. 21
A number of conservative Republicans were still uneasy
about the Treaty. Senator Taft warned that by signing the
Treaty, "we put ourselves at the mercy of the foreign policies
of other nations, and do so for a period of 20 years." 22
Nevertheless, the North Atlantic Treaty was approved July 21,
1949, by a vote of 82 to 13. On July 25, 1949, President
Truman signed the Treaty Ratification. By August 24, 1949,
ratification from enough of the member states had been made to
bring the treaty into effect. NATO became a reality. 23
The peacetime coalition built was a product of the Cold
War and Red Threat, presidential reaction to that threat, and
Congressional temperance to Presidential adventurism. Yet
coalition building between the executive and legislative
branch ensured that the coalition among the Atlantic nations
would be a success. The sticking point would come with the
burden-sharing and troop issue.
Furthermore, the Alliance continued the American presence
in a leadership role in Europe following the Second World War.
21 Williams, p. 63. See also The Vandenberq Resolution and
the North Atlantic Treaty , pp. 357-387.
22 Congressional Record , July 11, 1949, p. 9205.
23 Truman, p. 2 51.
21
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Alliance were
logical extensions of commitments the United States had made
to Europe in World War II. Linkage to Europe meant that the
U.S. could continue to enhance stability worldwide. Congress
and the President shared a desire to not only influence world
events, but to ensure that the United States possessed the
dominant role.
D. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
In order to fulfill Congressional desires for European
self help and to ensure a dominant American voice in a
formidable military alliance, the Truman Administration had
one more foreign policy objective. Flushed with the success of
the Marshall Plan and NATO, President Truman's next step was
to propose the Military Assistance Program (MAP) . As mentioned
above, MAP was the third leg in Truman's grand scheme to
provide economic aid, U.S. defensive assurances and
guarantees, and military aid for Europe's recovery.
All the members of the alliance suspected that the success
of NATO was linked to military assistance. On the same day
(July 23, 1949) that President Truman signed the North
Atlantic Treaty, he proposed the Military Assistance Program
to Congress. According to Truman, only through the "program of
military assistance now proposed" could a "tangible assurance
22
of our purpose" 24 prove to the Soviets the degree of American
resolve
.
This time, however, Truman made a tactical mistake; he
left Congress out of the consultations. MAP was a crucial
element of Truman's grand plan. By disregarding Congress in
the formulation of the idea, Truman was at the mercy of
Congress not only for approval of the plan, but also for the
amount of money appropriated for the Military Assistance
Program. Even traditional supporters of Truman's foreign
policy were upset. Senator Vandenberg "was appalled and
angered by the disregard for liaison procedures that had been
so essential to the creation of bipartisanship support for
previous undertakings." 25 Chairman Connally expressed the
"burden-sharing" concerns of the Congress:
What I have been fearing about this whole program... is
that most of those countries in Europe are just going to
sit down and fold their hands and say "well, the United
States is going to arm us. The United States is going to
protect us. . .The American people are not favorable to our
just saying "all right, now, you just go ahead, we will
take care of you. We will furnish you food, lineament, and
money and arms, and men if necessary." The next call we
are going to have will be for men. They are going to want
men, soldiers. 26
24 Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 42.
25 Williams, p. 27




The Administration tried to dismiss the troops issue.
Instead, they attempted to sell the Military Assistance
Program by mirroring the arguments behind the Marshall Plan.
Only by American assistance could the Europeans become self
sufficient in the defense realm. Thus, they argued, in order
to lower American defense spending in the future, military aid
to Europe must increase now.
Moreover, State Department officials, in an effort to
soothe Congressional ire, tried to downplay the scope of the
Military Assistance Program. Administration witnesses
attempted to alleviate the fears of Connally and others that
America would end up carrying an inordinate share of the
burden. 27 Instead, officials played up the idea that MAP was
merely an extension of European self-help, a notion embraced
by Vandenberg and other Senators in the North Atlantic Treaty
hearings. Furthermore, the Administration stressed that the
Europeans would spend six dollars for every one dollar the
Americans granted in military aid. 28
Members of Congress were not without their doubts . Senator
Vandenberg was instrumental in cutting back the amount of
requested aid, and as well as in persuading fellow senators to
be skeptical of the Military Assistance Program. Vandenberg
was worried that MAP gave the President "virtually unlimited
27 Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 40. Kaplan refers
to it as a raid on the American Treasury.
28 Williams, p. 31.
24
power to give aid wherever he deemed appropriate"
.
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Vandenberg, however, did see some merit in the program. It
provided a deterrent value and did fulfill the goals of the
Administration. Again, however, it was the Soviets who
provided the Administration with the push it needed. On
September 22, 1949, President Truman announced that the
Soviets had detonated an atomic bomb. Six days later, Congress
approved the appropriations for NATO. 30
E . KOREA
The North Atlantic Treaty, MAP, and the Marshall Plan all
envisioned a rebuilt and rearmed West Europe that would be
able to withstand a Soviet invasion. None of the programs,
however, brought about the rapid rearmament of Western Europe.
In early 1950, Truman directed a study in light of the loss of
China, Soviet advances in Europe, and the detonation of the
Soviet nuclear weapon. In April, the National Security Council
released its policy paper number 68. NSC 68, written by Paul
Nitze, became the justification and rationale behind the
Administration's strategy to wage the Cold War.
NSC 68 was the logical application of the Truman Doctrine.
It was global in scope, and, as Russell E. Weigley notes,
29 A. H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of
Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 504.
30 Steven E. Ambrose, Rise To Globalism: American Foreign
Policy, 1938-1980 (Harrisburg, VA: George Banta Co., 1980), p.
158.
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NSC 68 suggested a danger of limited war, of Communist
military adventures disguised not to annihilate the West
but merely to expand the periphery of the Communist
domains, limited enough that an American riposte of atomic
annihilation would be disproportionate in both morality
and expectancy. 31
NSC 68 urged "an immediate and large scale build up in (U.S.)
military and general strength and that of (U.S.) allies with
the intention of righting the balance of power" and thus
preventing any Russian expansion. 32 The policy advocated by
NSC 68 was expensive (up to 35 billion dollars a year to rearm
Europe and the U.S.) 33 and the urgency of the message was
lost on Europeans and Americans alike. Congress was not
willing to support the high expenditures envisioned by the
Administration and NSC 68. The North Korean attack upon South
Korea changed that attitude.
On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops poured across the
38th parallel, sending South Korean forces reeling in defeat.
By the end of the day, the United Nations Security Council
gave the U.S. its support for any military intervention in
Korea. On June 26, 1950, the President made the Truman
Doctrine a global commitment, announcing that further
31 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War
Bloomington, ID: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 382.








On June 27, Truman met with fourteen members of Congress,
spelling out his objectives in the Korean conflict. Senator
Connally and Representative John Kee (D-WV) made some
suggestions about the wording of the U.N. resolution, but
"apparently expressed no demand to participate more
extensively in determining U.S. policy with respect to the
Korean incident." 35
By June 30, President Truman had decided to send U.S.
troops to Korea. That same day, the President met with fifteen
Congressional leaders to inform them of his actions. Senator
Kenneth Wherry (R-NE) was angry with Truman for not meeting
with Congress prior to his decision. Yet Representative Dewey
Short (R-MO) , ranking Republican of the House Armed services
Committee (HASC)
, "cut him off with an endorsement of the
President's action." 36 The Congressmen were handed a fait
accompli of the President's actions. Due to the nature of the
crisis, they felt they had to support the deployment of troops
to Korea.
34 Ibid., p. 171
35 James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making
A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative (Homewood, IL
The Dewey Press, 19 62), p. 49.
36 Ibid.
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F. COALITION WAR IN KOREA
Following Truman's decision to send troops to the Korean
Conflict, the United States was poorly prepared to fight. The
troops closest and first sent to the war were Occupation
troops from Japan. The first three divisions sent to Korea
were inadequately trained and badly understrength. 37 Two of
the divisions had only six (instead of nine) battalions of
infantry. The equipment was World War II vintage, badly worn
and in poor shape. The South Korean Army that the American
troops were to reinforce were likewise profoundly demoralized
from the disastrous retreat. The combined forces were no match
for the advancing North Korean Army. Allied forces ultimately
held a perimeter in the South until U.S. reinforcements could
arrive. By mid-September, following reinforcement and an
amphibious landing at Inchon, the tide of the war turned. The
North Koreans retreated rapidly in the face of an allied
onslaught
.
Truman's approach to coalition warfare was typically
American. First, Truman sought (and obtained) a United Nations
resolution condemning the North Korean attack. The resolution
tied the U.N. to any action the United States might take. 38
The American rush to obtain U.N. backing proves three points.
First, in international conflict, the United States strives
37 F.A. Godfrey, "Crisis in Korea," in War in Peace , ed
Sir Robert Thompson (New York: Harmony Press, 1981), p. 50.
38 Ambrose, p . 171
.
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for world acceptance of U.S. actions. Whether for moral or
political reasons, the United States seeks world approval of
its actions. Second, the U.N. resolution provided world
assistance in terms of financial and manpower support for the
ongoing conflict. From a burden-sharing point of view, the
U.N. resolution was vital for U.S. interventionists. Finally,
and critically linked to the second point, by obtaining
support from a bureaucratic body like the U.N., Truman could
more readily enlist Congressional support for his policy. In
other words, by demonstrating United Nations' approval of
actions and willingness to share the burdens and risks, Truman
could better "sell" his decisions and policies to Congress.
Also true to U.S. style, despite promised U.N.
involvement, the United States provided the bulk of equipment
and non-Korean fighting men in the war. Fifty-three of the
fifty-nine members of the U.N. approved of the 27 June
resolution. Of those, forty states offered help, but only
fifteen (apart from the United States) provided military
forces to Korea. 39 The United Nations troops amounted to a
token force of 44,000 men (compared to over 300,000 U.S.
troops during the peak of the war)
.
40 As a result, the United
39 War in Peace
, p. 52. Another 5 nations sent medical
forces
.
40 Ibid. The British Commonwealth provided the largest
amount of ground forces in the United Nations force. Australia
provided two infantry battalions and one fighter squadron;
Canada provided an infantry brigade and a squadron of
transport aircraft; Great Britain, two infantry brigades, one
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States, in providing the mass of equipment and troops, took
command of all forces in Korea. As long as the United States
suffered the majority of the risks, the U.S. would retain
command of coalition forces in the conflict.
Armistice talks began June 1951 after fighting settled
down to a stalemate on the 38th parallel. When newly elected
President Eisenhower threatened to end the war by "whatever
means possible", the armistice was finally signed. On July 27,
1953, the Korean War ended. 41The United States had suffered
34,000 deaths with 105,000 more wounded. South Korea lost over
50,000 men. The North Koreans lost roughly 500,000; The
Chinese approximately 900, 000. 42
G. CONSEQUENCES OF KOREA
The outbreak of the Korean War was enough to convince
Congress of the need for a massive rearmament program. In
armored regiment, artillery regiments, and two squadrons of
fighter aircraft; and New Zealand, one artillery regiment. All
but New Zealand also provided naval forces. Belgium, Columbia,
Ethiopia, France, Greece, Holland, Philippines, and Thailand
each sent approximately one infantry battalion. Turkey sent an
infantry brigade; South Africa, a fighter squadron; and
Luxembourg, one infantry company. Also, Denmark, India, Italy,
Norway, and Sweden sent medical forces and aid to South Korea.
The token size of the coalition forces in relation to the size
of the American forces closely mirrors the levels of the
Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991.




1950, the United States was ill prepared to fight a
conventional war; the North Atlantic allies were in even
worse shape. The Korean conflict vindicated the arms buildup
envisioned in NSC 68. By August 1950, Congress authorized an
additional three and a half billion dollars in European
aid. 43 Congress approved of Truman's plan to contain the
Communist threat on a global scale.
More important was the realization that containment would
require more than material and money alone. President Truman
and the Defense Department wanted to send American troops to
Europe as a deterrent to the Soviets. On September 9, Truman
announced that the buildup in armed forces would include
"sending substantial numbers" of American troops to Europe. 44
Three days later, the President proposed the creation of ten
German divisions to assist in carrying out the containment
policy. Although the French and British protested, Acheson
insisted and ultimately prevailed. The French accepted German
rearmament on the condition that the Americans commit ground
forces to Germany. 45 Thus, the Korean war precipitated the
evolution of NATO from an assistance oriented organization to
a cohesive, interdependent military alliance. The war was the
43 Williams, p. 36.
44 Ambrose, p. 175.
45 Williams, p. 38.
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catalyst behind NATO's transformation into a coalition under
U.S. dominance. 46
Finally, the Korean War was the capstone of Truman's
foreign policy. In six years, Truman had succeeded in
convincing a traditionally isolationist Congress to support a
nation on Cold War footing. Truman's accomplishments were
many: the Truman doctrine, Marshall Plan, Military Assistance
Program, NATO, six U.S. divisions sent to Europe, German
rearmament, and an American commitment to stop Soviet
(Communist) aggression. Steven Ambrose summed up the American
role in burden-sharing and commitment to containment: Truman
had learned
"not to push beyond the iron and bamboo curtains, but he
made sure that if any communist showed his head on the
free side of the line, someone-- usually an American--
would be there to shoot him." 47
Truman's containment policy was rolling-- the only task left
was to sell the program to Congress.
H. THE GREAT DEBATE
Selling the program to Congress would prove to be no easy
chore. Truman's decision to send troops to Europe sparked a
46 David Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and
Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 25.
Calleo, emphasizing Washington's role as the leader of NATO,
adds that the "Supreme Allied Commander has never been the
first servant of the [NATO] Council, but the viceroy of the
American president" (p. 27).
47 Ambrose, p. 180.
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controversy in the Congress. The issues, among other things,
were envisioned "entangling alliances", burden-sharing in
Europe, and the role of Congress in foreign policy. Already
President Truman had dispatched troops to an undeclared war in
Korea; the commitment of American forces to the NATO alliance
was seen by many in Congress as a direct challenge to their
constitutional authority. Thus, from January through March of
1951, Congress was caught up in the debate over the above
issues
.
The Great Debate began, according to Secretary of State
Acheson, during a joint session of the Foreign Affairs
Committees on December 22, 1951. Acheson was to report on his
latest trip to Brussels, and "all was affability" between the
Secretary and "his guardian committees". 48 Although the
meeting went well, Acheson felt obliged to speak later that
afternoon of American commitments abroad.
Earlier that month, the former American Ambassador to
Great Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy, had denounced American
foreign policy. 49 The real challenge, however, was made by
former President Herbert Hoover. On December 20, Hoover
lambasted the "containment" theory and heavy U.S. involvement
48 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the
State Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
1969)
, p. 488.
49 Ibid. Kennedy called U.S. foreign policy "suicidal" and
"morally bankrupt", denounced American allies, and demanded




overseas. While he did not advocate a complete withdrawal to
Fortress America, he did suggest the United States leave the
European continent and provide the Allies with material
assistance alone. 50 Hoover's final "principle"-- that the
prime obligation to defend Europe should rest with the nations
of Europe-- found many eager supporters in Congress.
Acheson's rebuttal on the evening of December 22 called
for American resolve "to build our strength side by side with
our allies, calling upon the entire free world to maintain its
freedom" 51 Acheson rightfully supported his Administration's
goals and accomplishments to date. The Great Debate would
decisively challenge the Executive Branch's power to
accomplish further goals in coalition building and foreign
policy.
Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 149. Hoover's
Comments were not new; he had originally suggested them two
months earlier in a speech on October 20, 1950. His December
speech summed up both American and Soviet strengths in
manpower and military power. Hoover reached four conclusions:
U.S. ground forces could not win a conventional war; American
sea and air power could hold the Western Hemisphere; The A-
bomb had lost importance; and U.N. forces had been defeated in
Korea, leaving the U.S. economically shattered. Hoover
therefore suggested seven "principles" for the U.S.: First,
preserve the Western Hemisphere as a Western Gibraltar;
Second, build air/sea power on the island periphery of Europe;
Third, arm air/sea power to the teeth; Fourth, after a short
intense buildup, reduce expenditures, and balance the budget;
Fifth, aid the hungry of the world; Sixth, no appeasement;
Seventh, let the Europeans defend Europe. See Norman A.
Graebner, ed., Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the
Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 742-745.
51 Acheson, Present at the Creation
, p. 490.
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The debate on the floor of the Congress began
appropriately enough with a speech by the Senate's chief
isolationist, Robert Taft. Inspired by Hoover's speech, Taft
argued on January 5, 1951, against military assistance and the
dispatch of troops to Europe . More important, claimed Taft,
would be the increase in Presidential powers that such a
deployment of forces would have. 52
Taft, like Hoover, did not believe that the United States
should totally abandon Europe as the fight against Communism.
Instead, U.S. interests lay in material assistance and
aligning the United States with the "island nations" on the
periphery of Europe. He also acknowledged the need for a
permanent land army, just not one on the scale that the
Administration envisioned.
Taft's isolationist thoughts struck a sympathetic chcrd
among fellow Senators. As keepers of the purse, alignment with
the island nations would be less burdening than to commit
forces to a large standing army on the Continent. Second, Taft
charged that the Truman Administration's desire to create a
standing army of three million men would drive the country
into economic ruin. Most important, Taft feared an increase in
Truman's power. The President had already gained vast power
(at the expense of Congress) by sounding the alarm of the
encroaching Communist threat. Taft worried that by allowing
52 Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 151
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Truman to continue his foreign policy unchecked, Congressional
influence would be further diminished.
Taft's objections to Truman's policy were reflected
throughout the Congress. Kaplan suggests that Taft was more
interested in limiting executive power than in worrying about
American entanglements abroad. 53 In fact, a key element in
Taft's speech was over who was to conduct the foreign policy
and coalition building for the United States. Taft protested
over the President's sole claim to guidance of foreign policy.
Taft observed
As I see it, Members of Congress, and particularly Members
of the Senate, have a Constitutional obligation to
reexamine constantly and discuss the foreign policy of the
United States. If we permit appeals to unity to bring an
end to that criticism, we endanger not only the
constitutional liberties of the country, but even its
future existence. 54
Rather than an Executive branch-administered program, Taft
suggested that a combined executive-legislative approach to
foreign policy was far superior. In fact, Taft thought that if
the Congress sent troops to Europe, the action would not be as
threatening to the Soviets than if the President were to act
alone. 5 ' Taft's suggestion that the Congress seize the
initiative and send troops to Europe proved that he was not a
strict isolationist. He was more a moderate, willing to send
53 Ibid.
54 Congressional Record , January 5, 1951, p. 55
Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 151.
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troops to Europe, but wanting it to be a joint executive-
legislative decision.
Taft, however, merely sparked the Great Debate. Soon more
radically conservative Republicans like Senator Kenneth Wherry
joined the fray. Senator Wherry focused the issue of the Great
Debate by introducing Senate Resolution 8, which would limit
Executive power to deploy troops. The Resolution stated:
Resolved: That it is the sense of the Senate that no
ground forces of the United States should be assigned to
duty in the European area for the purposes of the North
Atlantic Treaty pending the formulation of a policy with
respect there to by the Congress..." 56
Wherry and Taft reiterated Hoover's questions concerning
the NATO coalition. 57 The first set of issues dealt with the
military side of NATO. Key Congressmen, concerned with the
economic and military burden into which Truman was plunging
headstrong, 51 questioned whether Europe could be defended.
They likewise questioned the extent that Europeans would make
to aid in their own defense (as promised at the establishment
56 Congressional Record , January 16, 1951, p. 320
57 Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance:
The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 208.
58 Taft: "We have given them billions of dollars, and are
preparing to give billions of dollars more, for arms aid, to
enable those countries to protect themselves. After all, there
are 225, 000, 000 people in Western Europe-- 50 percent more
than we have in the United States... They have more extra
manpower than we have in the United States today ." (emphasis
added). Congressional Record , January 5, 1951, p. 62.
37
of NATO) and the ultimate cost in aid that the United States
would eventually absorb.
The second issue raised was the extent to which Truman had
gone to build an effective coalition to combat the Communists.
The Berlin and Korean crises had strengthened Truman's
position, and encouraged him to act further. Congress, seeing
the growth of presidential influence, feared the growing power
of the Executive branch.
Truman was able to achieve such powers at Congressional
expense because of the extraordinary crises that arose
following the Second World War. By 1951, however, Congress
felt that its power was slipping away too quickly. Congress
had approved all of Truman's foreign policy to date. Now, with
an unpopular war bogging down in Korea, and the threat of a
Communist invasion of the United States increasingly unlikely,
Congress decided to take a stand.
All in Congress did not attack the Administration's desire
to station troops in Europe; in fact, many were sympathetic to
the Truman administration. Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL)
staunchly defended the Administration. On January 15, 1951,
Douglas rebutted Taft's burden-sharing concerns, commenting:
Let it be enough to say here that the Senator from Ohio
would tailor our security to fit his conception of proper
military costs instead of adjusting our military costs to
conform to the needs of true security... I am asking that
Congress stamp its formal approval on the sending of more
troops to Western Europe (emphasis added). 59
59 Congressional Record , January 15, 1951, p. 243
Douglas, in fact, was more hawkish than the Administration. In
the same speech, Douglas called for an increase in American
force levels to six million men by the end of the year, a goal
that was twice what the president requested. 60
Other rebuttals to Taft's and Wherry's proposals came from
Senators Tom Connally (Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee) and Senator Wayne Morse (R) of Oregon. The Senators
placed "considerable emphasis" on the strategic and economic
importance of Europe's industrial capacity and its
geographical position relative to the Soviet Union. 61 Loss of
Europe would be too serious a blow to the United States. Morse
likewise asserted that conventional and atomic weapons could
be complementary to each other rather than escalatory.
Finally, echoing Douglas's earlier speech, Connally "put the
point most succinctly" in stating that the U.S. international
role could not be "bought at the bargain center" and that no
price tag could be placed on national security. 62
The "price tag" of security remained a key issue
throughout the debate. Traditional cries of the allies not
carrying their share of the burden still troubled many
Congressmen. President Truman himself tried to combat that
problem early in the debate. During his State of the Union
60 Ibid.
, p. 248.
61 Williams, p. 59
62 Ibid
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address on January 8, 1951, Truman emphasized the commitment
that the allies had undertaken in their own defense, and
asserted that European force goals were actually higher than
American goals. Truman acknowledged the debate occurring and,
in true Presidential style, stated
First, we shall have to extend economic assistance where
it can be effective... Second, we shall continue our
military assistance to countries which want to defend
themselves. . . The heart of our Common Defense is the North
Atlantic Community. 63
He was met with applause.
As the burden-sharing aspect of the debate intensified,
the notion of an arithmetical ratio of U.S. forces to European
forces arose. The idea, originally proposed by the
Administration, was that for every six European divisions
raised, the United States would raise one. Furthermore,
additional U.S. divisions would only be sent once the
Europeans had raised their share of the army. Thus, if the
army was to grow, it would be only at a European
initiative. 64 Most important, however, was a growing
acceptance of U.S. troops in Europe. Of the prominent Senators
insisting on "self help," especially Hickenlooper and John
Stennis (D-MS) , the attitude was of limiting the amount of
U.S. troops rather that prohibiting them. Increasingly, the
Congress sent their message that they were willing to support
63 Congressional Record , January 8, 1951, p. 99
64 Williams, p. 61.
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the President's decision to deploy troops overseas. Congress,
however, wanted to flex its muscle. By debating and limiting
the extent to which the President could act (all in the name
of burden-sharing) , the Congress could effectively maintain at
least some voice in the foreign policy arena.
The debate continued, predominately in the Senate,
throughout January. On January 23, the Senate reached an
agreement to move the debate into a joint session of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed
Services. Their agenda specifically was to examine Wherry's
call for hearings on his resolution. 61 ' The hearings continued
through February.
The Administration wisely used the hearing to take the
offensive for the debate. High ranking military officials made
their arguments before the Committee. Eisenhower, appointed by
Truman to be Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on
December 19, 1950, 66 testified to the extent that the
European countries were providing for their own defense.
Likewise, Secretary of Defense Marshall claimed that NATO was
fulfilling a Congressional mandate for the defense of the
North Atlantic region. Marshall, in fact,
65 Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 151
66 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 187.
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"emphasized that the abilities of the Supreme Allied
Commander were beyond question, and that the intentions of
Congress were the nub of the problem.
"
67
Senator Vandenberg wrote to Senator Wherry from his
deathbed on February 17, 1951, and urged the Senate to
recognize to President as Commander in Chief. He likewise
reemphasized the U.S. obligation to NATO. 68 Of equal
importance, however, were Vandenberg' s Congressional biases in
urging the Resolution to
restate the great responsibility of Congress in decisions
of their character and it should urge the President to
submit his recommendations... when not incompatible with
the public interest. 69
The hearing continued for another month. Hickenlooper , chief
among Senate skeptics, had great credibility in criticizing
Acheson. He recounted Acheson's pledge of "no troops" during
the 1949 hearings. Acheson in 1951 made no excuses. Instead,
Acheson asserted his position remained the same. Conditions,
however, had changed, "making troops necessary irrespective of
the claims of Article 3." 70
The result of the debate was a compromise resolution
submitted by Senators Connally and Russell. The compromise
originally recommended that the United States contribute its
"fair share" of forces to the Atlantic Alliance, but that the
67 Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 152.
68 Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance
, p. 211.
69 The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg
, p. 571.
70 Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 152.
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President should consult with (among other people) the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Senate Committees of Armed Services and
Foreign Relations, and the House Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committees. 71 The resolution was then amended
further. Finally submitted to the floor as Senate Resolution
99, the resolution approved the appointment of Eisenhower as
SACEUR and recognized the security of the North Atlantic
Alliance. 72 On the troops issue, however, the resolution was
the most restrictive, stating:
it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of
sound constitutional processes... congressional approval
should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment
of American troops abroad... and the Senate hereby
approves the present plans of the President... to send
four additional divisions of ground forces to Western
Europe, but... that no ground troops in addition to such
four divisions should be sent to Western Europe. . . without
further Congressional approval." 3
Resolution 99 was passed by a vote of 69 to 21. 74 Wherry's
Resolution had failed, as had Taft's muted call for a return
to isolationism. The limits Resolution 99 placed upon the
Executive Branch were minimal, but it was important since that
it kept a Congressional "finger" in the foreign policy "pot".
71 Williams, p. 86.
72 Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance
, p. 211
73 Williams, pp. 90-91
74 Ireland, p. 242. Taft actually voted for the
Resolution; Wherry voted against it.
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Likewise, the Resolution did win the fight to limit the
desires of the Executive Branch. 75
More important, the Resolution actually endorsed Truman's
actions. 76 It demonstrated Congressional support of the
Atlantic Alliance and of defending the European continent.
Furthermore, the endorsement was accomplished during an
unpopular and dismal war in Korea. Thus, the Communist threat
provided sufficient impetus for the Congress to almost whole-
heartedly endorse Presidential actions.
Finally, burden-sharing emerged as both the dominant issue
and the key factor that Congress used in addressing the United
States and its coalitions. Senate Resolution 99 clearly stated
Congressional resolve for the Europeans to hold up their end
of the alliance. 77 Paragraph 5 included "the understanding
that the major contribution to the ground forces under General
Eisenhower command should be made by the European members of
the North Atlantic Treaty (emphasis added)
,
78 Distrust of the
Allies and belief that they were unwilling to do their fair
share led the Congress to include the paragraph.
The Great Debate brought gains to the Congress and focused
the issue for the country for the first quarter of 1951. In
75 Kaplan, A Community of Interests
, p. 153
76 Ibid.
77 Ireland, p. 211.
78 Williams, p. 8!
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the end, Congress successfully limited executive prerogative
and kept the burden sharing issue in the forefront . Yet the
results of the debate were unquestionably a victory for an
alliance-oriented Administration. It proved that, regardless
of the cost, the Truman Administration was able to accomplish





A. THE BURDEN REVISITED
Throughout the remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960s,
Congressional critics continued to challenge the deployment of
American troops to Europe. The Great Debate had demonstrated
the volatility of the "troops to Europe" issue. Yet the length
and passion of the Debate had been the opportunity for the
Congress to vent its frustration over the issue. Once the
Debate was over, acceptance of large numbers of American
troops in Europe came to be the established norm. 79
This chapter will examine two cases of Congressional
challenge to alliance-oriented Administrations. The first
case, the Mansfield Amendments of 1966-1972, illustrates the
ongoing struggle between Congress and the President over
foreign policy control. The second case, the Iran Contra
Affair, is an example of the executive branch circumventing
the legislative checks and balances built into the
Constitution. Both cases center on burden-sharing, coalition
support, and control over U.S. foreign policy.
79 Williams, p. 109.
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B. ' THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENTS
Although the passing of Resolution 99 ended the furor of
the Great Debate, many of the sentiments remained.
Conservative Republicans still chafed over the burden-sharing
issue with Europe. Likewise, as the years passed, critics in
Congress pointed to the "self-help" resolutions of the late
1940s. An economically resurgent Europe could and should take
on some of the burden in troops and money that the United
States shouldered.
By the late 1950s, a chief complaint among Congressional
critics was the "dollar drain" that the stationing of troops
placed upon the United States. The costs of troops stationed
in Western Europe are shouldered by and large by the country
providing the troops. 8( Critics argued that American
servicemen spent American dollars on porsches and cuckoo
clocks while overseas; likewise, the U.S. government paid
foreign contractors to conduct work on the overseas bases.
U.S. dollars, then, were spent to boost foreign economies
rather than invested in U.S. goods and services. In addition,
they argued, the U.S. received nothing in return. 81
80 Gregory F. Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American
Forces in Germany (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978),
p. 5.
81 Host nations replied that they provided land for
military bases and many services at low or no cost. The United
States did enter into a series of "offset agreements" with
host nations. The U.S., in agreement, sold military equipment
to NATO countries, received "direct support" (fuel, land,
barracks, etc.), and usually some form of financial measures
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Furthermore, by the mid 1960s, the United States was
becoming more heavily involved in the war in Southeast Asia.
Simultaneously, France withdrew from NATO, further increasing
the burden on the remaining nations, and specifically on the
United States. The wide spread disillusionment with the
Vietnam War sparked a move by the Congress to reopen the
Debate on NATO burden-sharing. 82 The leading spokesman for
the current battle was Senator Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
(D-MT)
.
Senator Mansfield was regarded during the 1950s as "one of
the leading internationalists amongst the Democrats in the
Senate. " S: He had served in the Army, the Navy, and the
Marines. He supported the North Atlantic Treaty on the grounds
that it was an investment that would reap the U.S. benefits
far beyond the cost. NATO, as a coalition, not only increased
the American capability to wage war, but more importantly, it
denied those Western European resources to the Soviets.
By the late 1950s, Mansfield became increasingly
disillusioned by the lack of West European military power that
matched its increase in economic power. In 1961, he was
(foreign investment in U.S. T-bills, for example). See
Treverton, The Dollar Drain.
82 Karen A. McPherson, "No Entangling Alliances? The
Congress and NATO" in Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy: Issues
in the Quest for Collective Defense , ed . Alan Ned Sabrosky
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 66.
83 Williams, p. 117
.
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advocating partial U.S. troops withdrawals, which could
"contribute significantly to a redistribution of burdens and
responsibilities within NATO that was long overdue." 84 By
1966, "growing agitation" in Congress supported a move to
reduce the number of U.S. troops in Europe. 85 On August 31,
1966, Senator Mansfield proposed a "substantial reduction" of
U.S. forces stationed in Europe. 86
The sentiment of Mansfield and others in Congress erupted
in 1966 for a variety of reasons. First, as mentioned above,
disillusionment with the Vietnam War sparked a desire for a
retreat from internationalist policy. Neo Isolationism, as
Henry Kissinger argued, was "again made respectable by the
Vietnam War." 87 According to Kissinger, Senators such as
Mansfield characterized a return to "historical nostalgia" of
an America "uncontaminated by exposure to calculations of
Power and petty quarrels of short sighted foreigners." 88
84 Ibid.
, p. 131.
85 McPherson, p. 66
.
86
"Around the Capitol: U.S. Troop Cuts," Congressional
Quarterly , September 2, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press), p. 1911.
John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S.
Foreign Policy Making: a Study of Interaction and Influence,
1945-1982 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 128.
88 Rourke, p. 12 8.
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Moreover, agitation in the Congress was increased over the
French withdrawal from the NATO Joint Command. 89 Critics
correctly predicted the United States would have to pick up
more of the burden. Likewise, with a dollar declining relative
to foreign countries, stationing troops overseas became
increasingly expensive. 9C Mansfield stated that expenditures
on forces in Europe "are especially undesirable at a time of
balance of payments difficulties and enormous and growing
military costs." 91
The Johnson Administration took a subdued offensive.
Secretary McNamara "informed Senator Mansfield that in the
Administration's opinion this would not be a helpful step at
this time.""" Although Mansfield's proposal was only in the
form of a "Sense of the Senate Resolution," and therefore
without any real legislative "teeth", the Administration
feared significant political impact from the resolution.
First, the Administration was concerned that the troop
level question would assist an ongoing attempt to cut the
defense budget. In addition, President Johnson feared that the
Republicans would make troop levels in Europe an issue during
89 McPherson, p. 66.
90 Ibid.
"Around the Capitol," Congressional Quarterly
,
September 2, 1966, p. 1911.
92 Ibid.
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the 1968 Presidential campaign. 9 " Most importantly, however,
the Administration dreaded an increasingly angered and
disillusioned Congress which had the monetary power to enact
restrictive burden-sharing legislation. In order to preempt
Congress and attempt to swing momentum back on the side of the
Executive Branch, Johnson ordered the withdrawal of 60,000
troops from Europe. 94
Senator Mansfield, however, was not satisfied. He was
determined to exercise Congressional influence over the
matter, and annually proposed his resolution to reduce the
amount of U.S. troops in Europe. From 1966 to 1971, his
resolutions had little impact except to keep the Executive
Branch on the offensive by cutting naval strength and lowering
reserve commitments. Mansfield, however, was tired of
postponing troop reductions. Although he applauded European
efforts to increase their share of the defense burden,
Mansfield's primary concern now "was not more equitable
burden-sharing
, but a smaller American presence." 9 '
Mansfield was not the only critic of the troops in Europe.
Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) supported Mansfield's demands
for reductions. Proxmire observed:
93 Rourke, p. 128.
94 Rourke, p. 128. The troops consisted of part of one
Army division and a "number" of Air Force units.
95 Williams, p. 167.
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It seems to me that whereas President Nixon has properly
called for a Vietnamization of the war in Vietnam, we
should call for a Europeanization of Europe in defense. 96
On May 11, 1971, Senator Mansfield changed his tactics.
Rather than simply offer a Sense of the Senate Resolution, he
carried his attack to a piece of legislation that would have
a real and substantial impact. Mansfield offered an amendment
to the Draft Law Extension Bill (HR 6531) that would limit
funds for troops in Europe to cover only 150,000 personnel,
essentially cutting the present levels in half. Mansfield
defended his amendment, stating
Several times I have introduced resolutions making clear
one belief in the need for a substantial reduction in our
forces in Europe. Several times I have held off action
because I have not wished to disrupt an allegedly delicate
situation, or to give any justification to those who might
charge that we in the Senate have not given the most
mature and informed consideration to the problem. 97
Immediately the Nixon Administration took the offensive.
Believing "it would be easier to defeat the drastic Mansfield
Amendment than a more palatable compromise,
"
98 the
Administration mounted a one week all-out campaign to defeat
the proposal. Nixon obtained the backing of Presidents Johnson
("the amendment would endanger what we have achieved in the
96 Congressional Record , February 3, 1971, p. 1530.
Proxmire added that it was "unwholesome and unhealthy that
American troops have been stationed in a foreign country for
all these many years. It is wrong."
97
"U.S. Troops in Europe," Congressional Quarterly , May
14, 1971, p. 1065.
98 Rourke, p. 12 9.
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past and shatter our hopes for the future") 9 ' and Truman. He
also announced the support of former Secretaries Acheson,
Rusk, McNamara, as well as 21 other high ranking officials of
previous Administrations. 100 Mansfield referred to the
coalition as a "resurrection of the Old Guard." 101
The Administration's fear was well founded.
Dissatisfaction over Nixon's handling of the Vietnam War and
a continued burden to station "peacekeeping" troops around the
globe irritated many Congressman. Representative John Melcher
(D-MT) again raised the issue of the trade imbalance between
the U.S. and Europe, "aggravated by the $14 billion spent
annually" to station troops in Europe. 102 More important was
the manpower drain while fighting a war.
We still have 300, 000 men and 128 generals in Europe. . .It
would be difficult for me to believe that in all of the
NATO countries, none of which are engaged in the Vietnam
War, that there are not enough men and generals to take
over for part of our 300,000 troops and part of our 128
generals, which would still leave us with our share of the
NATO alliance commitment. 103
"European Troop Cut: Massive White House Lobby Effort,
"
Congressional Quarterly , May 21, 1971, p. 1096.
100 Ibid.
, p. 1095.
101 Ibid., p. 1096.
102 Congressional Record , May 17, 1971, p. 15211.
103 Ibid.
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Yet even the Democrats could not find unity. Representative
Les Aspin (D-WI) opposed reductions, since the overseas troops
enhanced American national security. 104
Five Congressional compromises were likewise proposed,
ranging from Senator Mathias's (R-MD) amendment to "maintain
the status quo in Europe" to Senator G. Nelson's (D-WI)
proposal to extend the timetable of Mansfield's cuts over two
years. Most important, however, was a Soviet proposal to
discuss multilateral withdrawals from Europe. In a May 14th
speech, Secretary Brezhnev repeated an offer made in March to
discuss troop withdrawals and arms reduction in Central
Europe. 10E The Soviet initiative gave the White House the
chance it desperately needed. The Senate seized on the
initiative as a reason not to reduce forces unilaterally , but
rather wait and cut forces as part of a bilateral
agreement. 106 The Mansfield Amendment was defeated May 19,
1971, by a 36-61 roll call vote. The five alternative
proposals were likewise defeated. 107
In November 1971, Mansfield again attached an amendment to
the Defense Appropriations Bill (HR 11731), proposing a 20
percent cut in European troops. Again, the Administration
104 Congressional Record , May 18, 1971, p. 15639.
105 Ibid.
106 Rourke, p. 12 9.
107
"Senate Defeats plans to Reduce U.S. troops in
Europe," Congressional Quarterly , May 21, 1971, p. 1101.
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response was immediate, 108 and again, Administration
influence prevailed. The second Mansfield Amendment lost by a
54-39 vote. 109 Although still a significant victory for the
Executive branch, Nixon had lost seven votes in the past six
months. Congressional dissatisfaction was making progress
against the Administration's position.
The drive to cut U.S. troops in Europe reached its peak in
1973. The primary reasons, according to Williams, were
the presence in the Senate of a profound and pervasive
sense of dissatisfaction as, more accurately, a
combination of impatience, disappointment, resentment and
frustration with the European allies, with the continuing
high levels of defense expenditure in the United States,
with the centralization of power in the Presidency, and,
perhaps most important, with the attitudes, actions, and
policies of President Nixon. 110
Congress was simply annoyed and frustrated with the lack of
burdensharing efforts by the European allies. Likewise,
momentum had gathered supporting Mansfield's proposals since
1971. Also, the spring and summer of 1973 saw another round of
dollar weakness abroad. Finally, American troop strength in
Europe had not be reduced during the Mutual Balanced Force
108 Nixon sent personal letters to key Congressmen, urging
them to vote down the Amendment. In the letter to Senator John
Stennis, he warned that "passage of the proposed troop cut
would, with one stroke, diminish Western military capability
in Europe and signal to friend and adversary alike
a... weakness of purpose in the American government."
Congressional Record , November 23, 1971, p. 42895.
109
"Nixon Survives Effort to Cut Defense Spending,
"
Congressional Quarterly , September 29, 1973, p. 2622.
110 Williams, p. 205.
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Reduction (MBFR) talks with the Soviets, which the
Administration had begun specifically to obstruct the
Mansfield initiatives. Congress wanted to flex its muscle and
make its voice heard in the foreign policy arena.
Prior to September, much behind the scenes bargaining set
the stage for the upcoming proposals, Many prominent
Democrats, especially Senators J. Fulbright (D-AR) , Philip
Hart (D-MI), and Fritz Hollings (D-SC) , expressed their
support of Mansfield's attack on increased military spending
at the expense of domestic programs. 111 Yet not only
Mansfield's forces were acting. Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA)
long a critic of troop withdrawal propositions, teamed in
August with Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) to propose an amendment
requiring the NATo allies to contribute to the cost of
stationing American troops in their countries. The amendment
would require the President to seek direct payments to the
United States to offset the yearly balance of payments deficit
caused by the cost of overseas forces. 112 If the allies
failed to offset the deficit, then a percentage of American
troops would be reduced (equal to the percentage of the
deficit) . The Jackson-Nunn amendment was clearly designed to
undermine the forthcoming Mansfield proposal.
in Ibid., p. 213
112
"Nixon Survives Effort to Cut Defense Spending,
"
Congressional Quarterly , September 29, 1973, p. 2622.
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On September 26, 1973, Senator Mansfield introduced his
amendment to cut U.S. troops by 50 percent, criticizing the
Jackson-Nunn amendment for not coming close to real reduction
goals. Ironically, the Mansfield Amendment itself was a
substitute for a similar amendment offered by Senator Alan
Cranston (D-CA) , which called for a 40 percent reduction in
overseas forces. Just prior to the vote, Mansfield modified
his amendment to mandate a 40 percent cut, identical to
Cranston's amendment. With this modification, the Senate
approved the Mansfield Amendment, 49-46. 113
Under Senate parliamentary procedure, however, the
original Cranston amendment, although identical , still had to
be voted upon. Due to Republican stalling and objections, the
vote was postponed until later that afternoon. This gave the
Administration time to lobby against the amendment. Defense
Secretary Schlesinger met with key Senators, notably Senator
Johnston (D-LA) . Likewise, General Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, telephoned (from Belgium) several
Senators. 114 The intense lobbying led to a switch of four
senators. The Cranston amendment was defeated by a 3 9-54
vote. 115 Thus, neither Mansfield's nor Cranston's amendments
carried. The following day, September 27, the Senate
113 Ibid.
114 Williams, p. 221
"Nixon Survives Effort," Congressional Quarterly
,
September 26, 1973, p. 2622.
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approved an amendment proposed by Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV)
and Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) to reduce overseas troops by
110,000 (a 23 percent cut). The amendment to HR 9286 (Defense
Authorization Bill) passed by a vote of 48-36. Despite strong
Administration objections, the Amendment passed since it
represented a compromise in forces reduced (23% vice 40 %) and
in part from a feeling that Senator Mansfield had been
humiliated at the hands of the Executive branch. 116
Furthermore, the Byrd-Humphrey Amendment allowed troops to be
withdrawn worldwide, not just from NATO.
The Mansfield Amendments were defeated for a number of
reasons. Clearly, many still saw the utility of troops
overseas. Some, like Aspin, recognized that economic savings
only would come with a demobilization of troops overseas; it
was relatively as expensive to station troops in the U.S. as
it was in Europe. Finally, the Soviet threat, though not
outwardly aggressive, still remained, and was actually growing
in military power.
The move by Congress to reduce the number of troops
demonstrates the rise of the activist Congress that began in
the mid 1960s. Congress increasingly saw a greater role for
themselves in foreign affair than merely as rubber stamps of
the President's policy. Unlike in Vandenberg ' s day, with the
most powerful Senators meeting with the President behind
116 Williams, p. 224
closed doors to help form and consent to foreign policy, the
Congress of the 1970s found itself more and more antagonistic
to the President's foreign policy.
Congressional opposition to the President existed for many
reasons. First, the character of the President himself brought
about much antagonism. Both Johnson and Nixon became more
"imperial" during their time in office. In other words, they
felt they were justified in their actions, regardless of the
approval of Congress. Nixon obviously acted without any
consideration of a Congressional check to his power. The
Watergate Scandal infuriated many Congressmen, who saw the
Executive branch as abusing its Constitutional Powers.
Second, burden-sharing became a more important issue to an
America that was no longer the uncontested dominant economic
power. To Congress, the President was doing nothing to relieve
the excessive economic and military burden placed upon the
United States. The Mansfield Amendments attacked the President
in three methods. It brought the burden-sharing debate into
the public eye, questioned the Presidential right to deploy
troops, and enhanced Congressional power by highlighting the
appropriations control it has over the Executive branch.
Disillusionment with the war in Vietnam was another reason
for the Congressional activism, especially in the burden-
sharing arena. The war showed to many Americans "the hazards
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of unchecked executive power." 117 Congress felt an obligation
as well as a desire to recoup power at the expense of the
executive branch. Moreover, the balance of payments uproar
over troops in Europe incensed many Congressmen. They wanted
the dollars to spend in their own districts at home in the
U.S.
Finally, the Mansfield Amendments demonstrate the
differences in perception of the external threat that existed
by 1973, and also by the change in domestic strength.
According to McPherson,
Political Pressures to remove troops from Europe were
generated by perceptions that the United States was
carrying more than its fair share of the defense burden of
the alliance, not by assumptions that the threat no longer
called for U.S. troops in Europe. 118
But the issue goes much deeper than that. With the desire for
increased burden sharing came the change in perception of the
external threat. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Congress
supported Truman's policies because of the fear of the Soviet
Union. In fact, communist aggression seemed to be everywhere;
Congressional approval of Truman's containment policy appeared
to be the only chance to stop the advance of Communism. By the
early 1970s, however, the external threat had seriously
diminished. The only Communist advances had been in minor
third world nations, which few regarded as a significant




threat to American national security. Thus, as the perceived
external threat diminished, the need for Congressional
acquiescence of Presidential foreign policy diminished also.
C. IRAN CONTRA
In the early 1980s, Congress again challenged the
Executive branch's conduct of foreign policy. This time,
however, instead of challenging a grand coalition, Congress
contested a small, U. S . -sponsored war in Nicaragua.
Congressional deletion of funds dictated that military aid to
Nicaragua stop. Yet forces in the Administration continued
funding the war, hitting at the heart of the burden-sharing
and control of foreign debate.
In 1979, General Anastaio Somoza Dbayle, President of
Nicaragua, was overthrown and replaced by a Communist
government under the central of the Sandinista party. The
Sandinista regime became "increasingly Anti-American and
autocratic," and "turned towards Cuba and the Soviet Union for
political, military, and economic assistance." 119 The
Nicaraguan Contras, the opponents of the Sandinista
government, began armed insurrection in an attempt to
119 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating
the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and
Additional Views, 100th conq, 1st sess, S. Rept No. 100-216,
H Rept No. 100-433 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), p. 3.
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overthrow the Communist leadership. In December 1981, the
United States began supporting the Contra Rebels.
President Reagan was dedicated to the Contra cause.
Without support for the rebels, proponents argued, the Soviets
would possess a formidable base in Central America. To them,
it would only be a few years before the rest of Central
America fell to Communist forces. Thus convinced, Reagan
provided foreign aid and military assistance to the Contra
Rebels
.
Many in the United States, however, were opposed to
funding the revolution in Nicaragua. Opponents feared that
support for the Contras would drag the U.S. into another ill
advised foreign war, much like Vietnam. Moreover, mistrust of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , which had armed and
supervised the Contra rebels, 120 fueled the fear that the
executive branch was incrementally involving the United States
in a war in Central America.
Although Congressional anger over the funding grew, the
CIA continued to aid the Contras, providing 90 million dollars
through 1982 and 1983. By 1984, the House of Representatives
voted to cut off all funding. Although the vote failed, it did
lead to a $24 million cap on Contra aid in 1984. 121
120 Ibid.
121 The Iran Contra Puzzle (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Inc., 1987), p. 4.
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The Administration battled many factors in the effort to
push Contra aid through the Congress. The immediate threat to
the United States was not clearly apparent. With a low
external threat and repeated comparisons to Vietnam ,
Congressional reluctance to become involved in this overseas
commitment derailed any Executive chance for an adventurous
ant i -Communist foreign policy. Finally, internal disputes
within the Reagan Administration hindered Reagan policy. Leaks
and infighting demonstrated a less than coherent approach to
foreign policy. 122
Through a series of legislation known as the Boland
Amendments, Congress prohibited Contra Aid "for the purpose of
overthrowing the Sandanista Government." 123 Boland I allowed
only humanitarian aid to the rebels, while Boland II limited
all aid to the Contras in 1984 to $24 million. By late 1984,
following disclosure that the CIA had covertly misused
Nicaraguan harbors, Congress cut off all funds for the
Contra' s military operations.
The President, however, still wanted to aid the Contra
Rebels. He ordered his National Security Advisor to "find a
way to keep the Contras body and soul together." 124 The
Security Council decided that though private donations, the
122 Ibid.






Contras could maintain their fight against the Sandinista
regime. The man in charge of the operation was Lt . Col. Oliver
L. North, USMC.
The importance of this event cannot be overemphasized. For
the first time, and with Presidential acquiescence, the
executive branch would step outside the Constitutional
provisions of the government to obtain funding for a foreign
policy goal. The Boland Amendments had cut off all money to
the Contra Rebels. Yet private donations, not routed through
the U.S. government, were perfectly legal, and seemed the
ideal path to channel funds to the Contra effort.
The Reagan Administration first solicited King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia in 1984. Former National Security Advisor Robert
C. MacFarlane convinced King Fahd to provide $1 million a
month to the Contras. King Fahd later agreed to double his
contribution, and by 1985 had contributed approximately $32
million. Taiwan, at the Administrations request, provided $2
million. Likewise the Sultan of Brunei donated $10 million
(although the money was inadvertently sent to the wrong Swiss
bank account and never reached the Contras) , 125
Private contributions were not limited to foreign
governments. Lt . Col. North also briefed wealthy citizens and
private interest groups on the "plight" of the Contras, and
solicited money for their cause. North clearly filled any void
125 Iran Contra Puzzle
, p. 6
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that the CIA left by "phasing out" of the Contra business. 126
The Administration clearly approved of building support
through any channel for the ant i -communist rebels in
Nicaragua
.
North also was instrumental in arranging arms buys for the
Contras. Arms shipments from China, Poland, and other nations
arrived for the Contras, with Saudi money purchasing the
weapons. North later testified that he believed he was in
compliance with the law. The Boland Amendments, in North's
interpretation, barred involvement with the Contras by U.S.
intelligence operations, but not the National Security
Council. Admiral John Poindexter, North's supervisor and Chief
of the NSC staff, supported North's belief. 127
The chief flaw and inherent danger in North's and
Poindexter ' s argument is the role of the National Security
Council. The Council is an advisory board, designed to assist
the President in decision making in the vast world of
international affairs and U.S. National Security. It is not,
and was not designed to be, an operational entity. Other
organizations, specifically the CIA, exist for that purpose.
When the NSC can determine policy, raise revenue, and carry





and balances, then the Constitution is clearly being
circumvented.
North continued to fund the Contras, and sought new ways
to raise more money. At the same time, the Administration was
making covert overtures to Iran to help in releasing American
hostages in the Mideast. Iran, meanwhile, desperately needed
arms to fight its war with Iraq. Through a series of
middlemen, including Israel, North was able to sell arms to
Iran, and channel the profits to the Contras. Since the entire
operation was covert, the money sent to fund the rebels in
Nicaragua would never be accounted for.
As the story leaked out, Congressional uproar was
justifiably serious. Representative Jim Wright (D-TX) , House
Majority Leader, stated that "it defies credulity" that a
middle level advisor like North could determine U.S. foreign
policy. 128 Although Democrats in the Congress by and large
did not attack the President (perhaps because of Reagan's
popularity), 129 they did point to Iran-Contra as yet another
of Reagan's fiascos in foreign policy.
The Select Committee Report, issued November 18, 1987,
suggested "eliminating any Presidential discretion "for
disclosing to congress in advance of any covert operations.
The Majority report found serious flaws in Reagan's foreign
128
»i ran Arms and 'Contras": A Reagan Bombshell,
Congressional Quarterly , November 29, 1986, p. 2974.
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policy-making process, and placed the "ultimate
responsibility" upon the President. The Minority report, on
the other hand, accused Congress of overstepping its
constitutional powers when it used the appropriations measures
to block presidential foreign policy in Nicaragua.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The key issue in Iran-Contra deals with Congressional
power of the purse over Executive privilege. Congress had
every right to block funds to Nicaragua; the appropriations
process is its only real influence over the executive branch
and foreign policy. By acting outside of legislated law (the
Boland Amendments), the Administration went beyond its
Constitutional bounds.
More important, however, was the covert nature of the act.
Had the diversion of funds been made public, with
Congressional power to debate and make legislation regarding
the action, then the Administration would not have broken any
law. Once the decision was made to circumvent Congress's
Constitutional obligations, the Executive branch thwarted
democracy and the Constitution.
Congressional challenge to the executive branch is
necessary. The Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution with
checks and balances in mind. The Mansfield Amendments signaled
dissatisfaction with executive policy; Iran Contra
demonstrated Executive dissatisfaction with Congressional
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control. Both cases are examples of the friction that develops
between the branches of government in the absence of a clear
threat. As the period of detente and peaceful coexistence
continued, and the Soviet threat to the shares of the U.S.
waned, Congressional challenges to Presidential policy
increased.
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IV. DESERT SHIELD/ STORM: A CASE STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
The burdens coalitions place upon the United States never
left the Congressional eye. During the Reagan buildup,
Congress continued demands for allied assistance and self-help
in europe . One event in particular illustrated the
significance of external threats and burden-sharing to U.S.
national security-- the invasion of Kuwait.
On August 1, 1991, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied
Kuwait. Immediately, President Bush set out to establish a
coalition unprecedented in diversity of nationalities, unity
of purpose, and speed of coming together. The Persian Gulf War
brought about significant enhancement of the President's power
and stature at the expense of Congress. President Bush was
applauded for his ability to bring together a coalition of
forces that could effectively fight and win a war.
Simultaneously, the Administration roamed the globe searching
for financial support to further achieve the President's
foreign policy goals.
This chapter will examine the legalities, ethics, and
rights of the President to raise and spend money to pursue an
administration's foreign policy. At issue is the treading of
the executive branch upon the Congressional power of the
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purse. Furthermore, it will examine the role of Congress in
foreign policy and burden-sharing. The circumstances
surrounding the Persian Gulf War further emphasized the
divisions inherent in the American government
.
By analyzing a case study of Desert Shield/Storm, this
chapter will suggest that Congress has not only sole power of
the purse, but also that President Bush tried to usurp that
power by collecting funds for his foreign policy goals.
Furthermore, it will illustrate that Congress does have a
significant voice and role in foreign policy. The results of
Desert Storm may have significantly shaped the role of the
President and Congress in U.S. foreign policy for years to
come .Finally , in light of the "external threat/Congressional
Reaction" theory, Desert Storm provides interesting insight.
Although the invasion of Kuwait provided no direct military
threat to the United States, the long term economic and
balance of power threats to America were very apparent.
Presidential money-raising circumvented one key Congressional
worry (and source of power) . Thus, the President could coopt
Congress through both an envisioned external threat and a
shared burden-sharing aspect.
B. THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT
"The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America." 130
130 U.S., Constitution , art. II, sec. 1.
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The Constitution entrusts the President with executing all
legislation passed by Congress. He swears faithfully to
execute the duties of the office. By and large, Congress
trusts him with the conduct of foreign policy. The
Constitution establishes him as the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. When all these interests come together, however,
conflicts are bound to happen.
The Iraqi invasion set into motion an alliance
unprecedented in world history. Almost simultaneously,
President Bush ordered the establishment of Desert Shield, a
military deployment to contain Hussein's aggression. His
alliance building was more than merely strategic; when
countries could not support the alliance with arms and men,
the Administration requested "alternate" means of support.
Such support was more than financial. Certain countries
provided medical teams, chemical warfare detecting vehicles,
and food and shelter for the troops. Primarily, however, they
provided money .
The question then arose over the legality of the issue.
President Bush established the United States as the "world's
policeman" in his New World Order. As the world's policeman,
the implication seemed to be that, while the U.S. provided the
police force, other nations would pay their "wages". By
requesting financial payments, one could accuse the President
(and Congress through their tacit agreement) of establishing
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the United States as a mercenary nation, with a military ready
to be deployed to the highest bidder.
Yet burden-sharing was of vital importance during the
buildup. President Bush realized early during the Persian Gulf
Crisis that the United States could not defeat Saddam Hussein
alone. Not only was support necessary from nations such as
Saudi Arabia for airfields and military bases, but the sheer
cost in manpower and money would be detrimental to a slowing
American economy. 131 The Americans needed allied support in
every fashion. The quest for financial support was a sideshow
in comparison to the real issue of coalition building in
American foreign policy. Within a week of the invasion, Bush
made several calls to American allies for support in the
Persian Gulf Crisis. In fact, the support he requested was not
primarily for financial support, but rather for military and
embargo support. 132
Congress as a whole supported Bush's decision. As the
appropriators and managers of U.S. budgetary dollars, Congress
131 The cessation of Kuwait's and Iraq's combined oil
output (in excess of 3 million barrels per day) in itself
would have a profound impact on the world economy through
higher oil prices as demand exceeded supply. The President
dispatched Secretary of Defense Cheney to Saudi Arabia to
confirm Saudi agreement to boost production by 2 million
barrels a day. Eventually, the Saudis boosted production to
completely compensate for the embargo on Iraq. This also took
Congressional pressure off Bush to use strategic reserves to
counter rising oil prices. "Bush Sends U.S. Forces to Saudi
Arabia as Kingdom agrees to Confront Iraq, " New York Times ,
August 8, 1990, p. A10.
132 Author's interview.
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has a vested interest in the burden-sharing debate. As
discussed earlier, Congress has been the force driving the
President to enlist more support from U.S. allies. In fact,
Congress's initial support of Bush's deployment was due to the
President's very active coalition building during the first
week of the Crisis. In effect, Bush gained Congressional
support by coopting their views on burden-sharing and allied
support
.
Furthermore, Congressional support also resulted from
Congressional sympathies for the President. Congress cuts
deals every day. They understand the intricacies behind the
coalition building that the President achieved. Bureaucratic
admiration must, to some extent, have boosted the President's
policy in Congressional eyes.
With the beginnings of Congressional backing, the
President continued his coalition building at an unprecedented
rate. Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney
travelled the globe enlisting support; President Bush made
telephone calls to world leaders every hour. Congressional
support continued. The mood of Congress (and the nation) was
reflected by Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) : "It's
entirely appropriate for us to work with our allies around the
world and nations in the region to isolate Iraq." 133
133 Ibid
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Congress clearly approved of the job the President was
accomplishing. Two reasons stand out. First, as mentioned
above, Congressional support is indicative of the people they
represent. Obviously, if one's constituency supports the
President, the Congressman should also support the President.
Second, every nation the President enlisted to support Desert
Shield decreased the pressure on the American military.
Congressmen pose as patriots, and they do passionately care
about U.S. foreign policy. During the Crisis, Congress rallied
behind the President, presenting a unified front to both Iraq
and allies alike.
By August 9, President Bush appealed, "with a tone of some
anxiety," 134 for other nations to commit ground troops to the
defense of Saudi Arabia. The President continued to call for
military support, especially from the NATO countries. On
August 17, both Japan and Germany hinted at sending military
support forces, but the debate over their Constitutional
legality stifled the discussion. 135
On August 23, Japan offered to provide financial aid to
Middle East nations that would suffer as a result of the Iraqi
trade embargo. President Bush suggested that Japan help
134
"Washington Appeals for Ground Forces From Other
Countries," New York Times , August 10, 1990, p. Al
.
135 The willingness to quickly dismiss the deployment of
troops to the region without a true national debate rightfully
angered Congress. "Japan Considers A Role In The Gulf Force,"
New York Times , August 18, 1990, p. A6
.
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finance the international forces to the Persian Gulf, cover
more of the annual costs of stationing American troops in
Japan, and that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces buy more
American made military equipment. 136
Of equal importance was the American aid received on that
same day. Saudi Arabia decided to suspend the nation's daily
export of hundreds of thousands of barrels of jet and diesel
fuel, and diverted the fuel to the American military. It was,
said the New York Times , "a downpayment on reimbursement for
United States aid in the Persian Gulf crisis." 137 The
exports were worth 5 million dollars a day, and the act was
the largest Saudi compensation to date.
Nevertheless, with acceptance of monetary contributions,
as mentioned earlier, one might suggest that the U.S. military
was now a mercenary force deployed to Saudi Arabia to play out
Arab interests to the tune of Saudi compensation. By accepting
payment for the use of the U.S. military, one could easily see
the detrimental precedent set. One can argue that it is better
not to accept any form of payment for Desert Shield than place
the stigma of "mercenary" upon U.S. forces (and likewise raise
expectations that the American military can be "bought")
.
Clearly, American forces supported Saudi interests.
Nevertheless, one cannot lose sight of the fact that American
136
"Japan Offering Billions to Arabs To Help Offset Gulf




forces also supported American interests. The two interests
were, in this case, the same: the expulsion of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait
.
Congressional opinion reinforced this attitude. During
Secretary Cheney's testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Senator John Warner (R-VA) began his comments by
addressing the mercenary issue. He, with Congressional
backing, was adamant that U.S. troops were not mercenaries in
any way. 138 The Secretary of Defense agreed. American forces
were not mercenaries, but rather forces deployed in the
national interest of the United States. In fact, monetary
support did not begin until three weeks after the decision to
deploy troops.
Congressional intervention at this point was important.
Congress, not the President, brought (and dismissed) the issue
into the public eye. This is due to their being more "in
touch" with their constituency than the President. Senator
138
"I would like to start by reading a term from the
dictionary. It is entitled 'Mercenary: working or acting
merely for money or other reward for the sole purpose of money
compensation. Fighting for a cause solely for pay as
renumeration . ' I hope, if we achieve nothing else in this
hearing, it is to put that term out of the context of
reference to this military operation. It is clear to me, and
it is clear to the country, as it is clear to the world, that
this military deployment was undertaken for the national
interest of this country... and certainly they march for the
cause of freedom. I think it is an insult to the men and women
of the Armed Forces to have that term applied to them in any
way. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and
Implications , 101st Congress, September 11, 1990.
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Warner deserves praise for bringing to the forefront a
politically sensitive issue (something that many politicians
are apprehensive to do)
.
The Japanese financial pledge was the key to what would
become overwhelming financial support from countries unwilling
or unable to provide military support. 139 Support from the
Japan came as a direct result of prompting from President
Bush. 140 Clearly the executive branch could make its weight
felt amongst the allies.
Japan specifically was quick to downplay their role in
"checkbook diplomacy." The Japanese government did not want
charges that Japan would send money while other countries,
particularly the United States, shouldered the military burden
of displacing Iraq from Kuwait. Instead, the Japanese
government announced that the President had suggested that
Japan help finance the international force in the Gulf, as
well as joining the embargo. 141
139 In the case of Japan and Germany, both countries
claimed their constitutions forbade participation. Saudi
Arabia, UAE, and other oil rich Arab states did provide
military support as well as considerable financial pledges.
The size of their armies paled in comparison to their ability
to provide substantial cash contributions.
140 Bush telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu urging support.
"Japan Is Offering Billions to Arab Countries Hurt by the Gulf
Crisis," New York Times , August 23, 1990, p. A14.
141 Ibid., p. A14 . Japan receives 12 percent of its oil
from Iraq and Kuwait
.
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Following the Japanese offer, the Saudi nation extended
its support further. By August 26, Saudi Arabia provided the
bulk of fuel, transportation, food, and shelter for the
growing American force. The Saudis were "willing to give
anything they had without any hesitation." 142
At this point, Congress could no longer watch the
President alone determine foreign policy at will.
Congressional involvement, with foreign policy guidance and
power at stake, began to rise. The Founding Fathers
established the Congress and executive branches to act as
checks to each other's power. Members of Congress see
themselves as the watchdogs of the President. To an extent,
they are right. Even as public support rallied behind the
President's Persian Gulf policy, Congressional lawmakers began
to question the cost and the purpose, as well as allied
burden-sharing
.
Congressional verbally gave backing to the President
following a brief given by the President to over 170
Congressmen on August 28. More important, support was
bipartisan. Representative Thomas Foley (D-WA) , Democratic
Speaker of the House, stated that "there's very strong support
for the President's actions. He was commended by speaker after
142 Ibid., August 27, 1990, p. A8 . Critics argue that the
Saudis alone could finance the entire Gulf operation with the
windfall generated by higher oil prices.
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speaker. There were really no overall reservations
expressed. " 143
Foley and Congress, however, were not without their
reservations. As the Pentagon doubled its estimate of
operational costs in less than two weeks time (from $1.2
billion to $2.5 billion), Congressional uneasiness over
burden-sharing surfaced. Some, like Senator Frank Lautenburg
(D-NJ) , argued that countries with no military forces should
help defray the costs: "the Japanese have a hell of interest
in this [sic] and ought to pay a hell of a lot more." 144
Lautenburg 's statement was indicative of both the mood of
Congress and of the nation. As the body that must ultimately
finance any foreign policy operation, Congress finds itself
increasingly caught between ambitious administration plans and
unfeasible monetary constraints. Furthermore, the burden-
sharing debate has historically been a sore subject in
Congress. As the group that always gets "stuck" with the bill,
Congress encourages any form of burden-sharing, especially
financial
.
Moreover, the President did not continually press the
issue because of the question of control. The more money and
troops the other nations provided, the less influence the
United States (and President Bush) would have over the
143
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situation. By pushing for some middle ground on donations,
Bush hoped to appease Congressional critics while maintaining
control of all the operations conducted.
By August 31, the Bush Administration announced that the
Persian Gulf Crisis would require world wide financial burden-
sharing of tens of billions of dollars. Administration
officials would not provide an exact price tag, but estimated
the cost would far exceed $25 billion. The burden-sharing
program remained to be negotiated by President Bush, Secretary
of State James A. Baker and Treasury Secretary Nicholas F.
Brady. 145 The Administration attempted to reassert its lead
in the burden-sharing debate. The President readied Baker and
Brady to start "passing the hat". 146
Congress, on the other hand, found itself trying to keep
up with presidential initiatives. Congress, for a variety of
reasons, often finds itself attempting to define its role in
issues initiated by the President. First, the President often
seizes the initiative on issues, and Congress must attempt to
catch up. Second, the public expects the President to be a
leader , especially in times of crisis. Third, whereas the
President can issue policy and have an administration to back
him up, Congress is a diverse political bureaucracy, with
145
"U.S. Says Gulf Moves' Cost Will Far Exceed $25
Billion," New York Times , September 1, 1990, p. 5.
146 The two distinct fund-raising efforts came to be known
around Washington as "Tin Cup One" and "Tin Cup Two"
.
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multiple interests, voices, and opinions. Power struggles
within the Congress often diminish its collective authority
and respect
.
In the Persian Gulf Crisis, Congress searched for the
correct role in the crisis. As politicians, they wanted a
visible leadership role. Therefore, 36 senators and
representatives toured Saudi Arabia and other Middle East
states on September 2. Although their findings generally
supported the President, the trip did continue to keep
Congress in the limelight. It also demonstrated Congress's
considerable influence in foreign policy. By travelling to the
Middle East, key Congressmen demonstrated that the President
is not the only voice of the United States. Indeed, many
Congressmen made additional remarks regarding the burden-
sharing debate. House leaders, particularly Representatives
Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and Robert Michel (R-IL) , called upon
other nations "to make more significant contributions through
the dispatch of additional troops". 147 They likewise
encouraged "higher levels of military spending in light of the
buildup,
"
148 while promising that the United States would do
its part.
147 .. The congressmen pointed to the NATO allies as the
nations who should be the first to give. "Lawmakers Touring
Persian Gulf Stressing Sanctions Over Combat, " New York Times
,




On September 6, as a result of Congressional and
Presidential urging, Saudi Arabia promised that it would cover
"virtually all of the hundreds of millions of dollars in
monthly operating costs of American forces based in or near
Saudi Arabia". 149 They likewise pledged to provide millions
in aid to countries hurt by the embargo, such as Egypt,
Turkey, and Syria. The next day Kuwait offered five billion
dollars in aid, essentially covering the entire military
deployment to the Persian Gulf. 150
The Kuwaiti and Saudi donations obviously enhanced the
Bush Administration's position in the Persian Gulf. By
agreeing to cover all operational costs, they removed a major
obstacle that Congress could erect upon the President. In
fact, their offer, although easing U.S. financial burdens,
essentially cut around the Congressional power of the purse,
as is discussed in the following pages. 151
With the sizeable influx of money to pay for Persian Gulf
operations, questions arose about the size and control of the
149
"Saudis to Cover U.S. Troops Cost And Help Middle East
Countries," New York Times
, September 7, 1990, p. Al
.
150 2.5 billion dollars would cover American operational
costs; the other half would be donated to Third World nations
affected by the embargo. "Deposed Kuwaiti Offers $5 Billion
For Gulf Effort," New York Times , September 8, 1990, p. Al
.
151 At the same time, European nations proposed aid to
countries damaged by the Gulf crisis. No aid would go to the
United States. Instead, approximately 2 billion would be
available to Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan. It was, in the eyes of




funds. Secretary Brady hinted that Arab contributions would
not only cover the costs of American involvement, but "may
even produce a profit for the treasury". 15 " The growing
Congressional uproar was understandable. During hearings
conducted in the Senate Armed Services Committee, senators
questioned control of the Gulf Aid. At issue, does the
Constitution allow the executive branch to control billions of
dollars in foreign aid pledged to the United States?
"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives..." 153
The Constitution gives sole power of the purse to the
Congress, placing a check on the power the executive branch
can wield. Yet by raising foreign contributions for his
Persian Gulf policy, President Bush was effectively
circumventing the issue. Congressional leaders, extremely
protective of their Constitutional basis of power, questioned
the Administration's intent.
The opening statement by Chairman Sam Nunn set the tone of
the Hearing. The senators not only wanted to "increase
significantly other nations' financial contributions to the
costs of this crisis," but also to see "what oversight should
152 Ibid.
, p. A4.
153 U.S., Constitution , art. I, sec. 7
be in place with respect to the expenditure by the executive
branch of these outside contributions." 154
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by law." 155
During the Hearings, Secretary Cheney was quick to point
out that all funds would be placed in the Treasury. The
Administration held that precedent existed: a 1954 law, the
Defense Gift Act, established procedure for private citizens
donating money for defense purposes. All donated funds are
deposited into the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Treasury
has the broad discretion to place the money in such accounts
as will best fulfill the intent of the donors. 156 Once placed
in such a category (research and development, operations,
etc), the Secretary of Defense can spend the money as he sees
fit. The spending is all done, of course, without any
authorization or appropriation from Congress.
"The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same
hands, whether legislative or executive." 15 ''
154 Senator Nunn's opening remarks, in Crisis in the
Persian Gulf , 101st Congress, 11 September 1990, p. 3.
155 U.S., Constitution, art. I, sec
156 U.S., Congress, Senate, Report to the Committee on
Armed Services , S. Rept . 480 to accompany S. 3144, 101st
Congress, 2d sess., 1990, p. 7.





Under continued Congressional pressure, the Administration
began to recant. Although legally within the law passed by
Congress in 1954, the 1954 Defense Gift Act was not designed
around substantial foreign contributions. It was, as Senator
Nunn pointed out, to provide for patriotic citizens to make
contributions to the Defense Department.
The legislation was born during the Cold War. It was
indicative of 1950s fear of Soviet aggression, and provided a
means for citizens to help in the defense against Communism.
Furthermore, in the 35 years since its enaction, the law had
only collected a few hundred thousand dollars.
The 1954 Defense Gift Act was not justification for the
President to spend his financial windfall. Moreover, the
billions of dollars available at the President's discretion
was not the Framers ' intent for the balance between Congress
and the executive branch. President Bush was establishing
dangerous precedent with both sword and purse in hand.
Administration actions brought about Congressional
outrage. No less than half the senators on the Armed Services
Committee questioned Administration officials specifically
about the monetary issue, emphasizing the importance Congress
staked in it. The Secretary of the Treasury agreed to notify
Congress of all money arriving in the Treasury and how it
would be spent. Likewise, the Congress amended the 1954
Defense Gift Act, enacting the following restrictions on
donated funds. The funds could not be used for illegal
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activities, could only be used for operational programs,
projects, and activities associated with Desert Storm, and




The Administration chose to abide by the Congressional
mandates. As a President riding high in the polls and flushed
with success, Bush could easily have challenged Congress on
this issue. Four reasons exist for the acquiescence of the
Administration. First, the President realized he was
constitutionally and ethically wrong on the point. Second, if
challenged, Congress could have passed further legislation
restricting the President's funds in some way. Third, the
President needed Congressional support for the debate on the
war yet to come. Without overwhelming Congressional support on
the question of going to war, Bush knew better than to
challenge Congress on a trivial issue with key debates yet to
come. Finally, direct confrontation is not the President's
style. Bush is a compromiser, who tends to build broad
coalitions to achieve his policy.
C. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY
The most important result of Desert Shield is the impact
Congress had on foreign policy. Although the President gained
significant popularity as an outcome of the War, Congress too
:S8 Report of the Committee on Armed Services , S. rept 480
to accompany S. 3144.
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found its role in foreign policy greatly enhanced. In fact,
Congress unknowingly may have discovered their niche in
foreign policy.
The Constitution gives the President the right to receive
foreign ministers and dignitaries, but nothing prohibits
Congress from conducting their own foreign program. They have,
for the most part, left foreign affairs to the President.
Nevertheless, Congress can and does wield significant power
and influence with foreign governments.
Why does Congress interfere in the President's realm of
foreign policy? One reason, discussed above, is financial. In
order to support foreign endeavors, Congress must authorize
and appropriate funds for the President. The more
controversial the enterprise (aid to the Contras, arms sales
to Saudis), the more Congress "interferes." Second, in the
constant struggle for political power between Congress and the
President, foreign policy is merely another battlefield.
Congress wields the purse; the President wields the sword.
Nothing, however, excludes Congressmen from conducting their
own foreign affairs policy. Fact-finding missions, meetings
with heads of state, and junkets abroad are but a few of the
methods Congressmen have at their disposal to influence
American foreign policy.
The most important reason Congressmen "meddle" in foreign
affairs is a genuine interest in foreign affairs. Granted,
foreign policy keeps an active congressman in the limelight
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and on the front page, but a number of issues exist that can
achieve the same goal. Congressmen are Americans. Although
their goals and beliefs may differ from the President's (not
to mention other Congressmen) , their primary motivation--
American national security-- is a common bond.
Their method to achieve this, whether intentional or not,
often falls into the "good cop, bad cop" role. 159 The
President, with a need to maintain cordial relations with
other heads of state, plays the good cop. He can ask for
foreign support, but threatens very little. Congress, on the
other hand, can rant and rave about foreign policy,
threatening to cut funding for any foreign endeavor unless
the offending nation succumb to U.S. demands.
The Persian Gulf Crisis drove home this point. The
President requested financial support from many nations, but
received little for his actions . lb0The House and Senate tour
of the Persian Gulf on the weekend of September 3, however,
prompted calls for increased Japanese and German aid in the
region. Moreover, Senate hearings (beginning 11 September
1990) raised several burden-sharing issues. Legislators
Pietro S. Nivola, A Question of Balance: the
President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy , edited by Thomas
E. Mann (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 239.
160 One exception is Saudi Arabia. As stated above, the
Saudis were very generous in opening their pocketbooks,
country, and society to the United States. Their government,
a kingdom, can accomplish things quicker and with greater
authority than a democracy. Furthermore, economic threats mean
little to the Saudi government.
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attacked the allies, calling donations "contemptible
tokenism", "almost an insult", and stating that "if there's no
profit in it for Japan, forget it." 161
Bush treaded lightly on the sensitive subject while
Congress railed against the allies. The House passed an
amendment carrying the burden-sharing theme further: it
reduced the 50,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan by 5000
troops per year unless the Japanese government began paying
all costs associated with the deployment. The amendment passed
the House 370-53 . 162
Two days later, Japan quadrupled to 4 billion dollars the
amount pledged to the multinational force. Likewise, in
Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl also pledged more help,
obviously to soften anger in the U.S. Congress. Although
Germany was struggling with its own unification burdens,
critics in Congress were quick to point out that Germany
offered 7.5 billion dollars in aid to its former enemies in
Moscow, but had still pledged nothing to its NATO allies in
the Gulf crisis. Throughout the Crisis, each time Congress
161 Quotes attributed to Senator John McCain (R-AZ)
,
Senator John Kerry (D-MA) , and Representative Carroll Hubbard
(D-KY) , respectively. "Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized For Not
Bearing More Of Gulf Cost," New York Times , September 13,
1990, p. Al.
162 Many members voted for the amendment, wanting to
signal their displeasure to Japan, as well as assuming that
the Amendment would never become law. "Democrats Continue
March Toward Big Defense Cuts, " Congressional Quarterly
,
September 15, 1990. p. 321.
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expressed anger towards stingy allies, Japan and Germany-
increased their pledges.
The President can bask in the support Congress unknowingly
creates for him. The President can validly claim to offending
governments that he has no control over Congress. Thus, to
outsiders, Congress must seem like a collection of renegades,
bent on eroding the President's power while expanding theirs.
The President wholly supports this. If this kind of bargaining
and role playing achieves his foreign policy, so be it.
D. CONCLUSION
Although the President's effort to raise and spend money
through foreign contributions is within the letter of the law
(the 1954 Defense Gifts Act), it obviously was not the
Framers ' intentions. Constitutionally and ethically, the
President crossed the line by combining both sword and purse
under one branch. Congress was right in questioning and
limiting the President's ability to conduct such
operations . 163
163 Congress has additional reason to distrust the
executive branch. When Congress cut off aid to the Contra
Rebels during the Reagan Administration, the National Security
Agency went about selling arms to Iran and using profits to
fund military operations in Nicaragua. Not only is the
intrusion on the power of the purse illegal, but the covert
operations conducted by a presidential advisory group raised
serious questions of legality and control in a democracy. See
Stephen Dyers et al
.
, National Security Law
,
(Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 1990), p. 348.
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Second, Congress has proved once again that they have both
a significant voice and role in foreign policy. Foreign
governments know they cannot exclude Congress when dealing
with the United States. The government, like the nation it
represents, consists of diverse elements, opinions, and bases
of power. Congress, through legislation, rhetoric, and the
power of the purse, has substantial influence abroad.
Finally, Desert Storm demonstrated the complimentary roles
that each branch of the government possess in the United
States. When one branch achieves too much power, it comes at
the expense of the other. Therefore, each branch attempts to
limit the opposite 's power. It is precisely what the Founding
Fathers envisioned in drafting the Constitution. It may not be
efficient, but it guarantees a free and strong United States.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. EVENTS, PERSONALITIES, AND CONGRESS
Coalition building is something relatively new to U.S.
foreign policy in the 20th century. Once a strongly
isolationist country, the United States, like Great Britain
before it, has increasingly become the nation most eager to
enter into alliances to maintain national interests abroad. As
such, the roles of Congress and the President have evolved
since 1945 as each branch struggles to influence American
foreign policy. Nowhere has this struggle been as obvious as
in the realm of burden-sharing.
What can be learned from 40 years of U.S. coalition
building? First, Congressional activism is clearly on the
rise. The Congress is a force to be reckoned with at home and
abroad. The executive branch must take into account the
actions of the legislative when considering foreign policy
actions
.
Second, the preceding pages have suggested that the amount
of Congressional activism depends upon the degree of the
perceived external threat. Lawrence Freedman observed that the
NATO alliance "is at its most coherent when dealing with
security problems that it best understands." 1 " 4 The same can
164 Freedman, The Troubled Alliance
, p. 161
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be said of the Congress. When the perceived external threat is
high, the Congress displays cohesion and unity. When the
threat is ambiguous or low, the Congress is increasingly
antagonistic towards the President.
Furthermore, external events play an important part in the
Congressional desire for a voice in coalition policy. During
the Great Debate, despite a continued threat from the Soviet
Union, many in the Congress rose up against Presidential
policy. Likewise, challenges to the troop deployments were
made throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In each case, the U.S.
was involved in an unpopular and frustrating war. Maintaining
troops overseas while fighting a war elsewhere was the
equivalent of a two front war. Congress recognized the drain
that the commitments placed upon the nation, and made attempts
through legislation to lessen these burdens.
Moreover, personalities played a key role in the
development of Congressional policy. During the creation of
NATO, the Administration consulted often with the powerful and
influential Senators, such as Connally and Vandenberg. During
the Great Debate, Vandenberg was on his deathbed, and no
Senator stepped in to replace his powerful personality. During
the 1960s, power had diffused throughout the Congress. No
single Senator or Representative could wield power and
influence the way Vandenberg had done. Thus, the overwhelming
personalities that Truman could rely upon to accomplish his
policies were no longer present by Nixon's time. By the same
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token, no one personality existed to challenge presidential
authority.
B. BURDEN- SHARING
Clearly, Congressional activism towards alliances, as in
the Great Debate, the Mansfield Amendments, and even the
Persian Gulf War, takes the form of a burden-sharing debate.
The burden-sharing issue is one aspect that the Congress has
control over; Congress alone can determine the amount of the
burden that the United States will shoulder. In spite of any
Presidential promise or plea, Congress alone appropriates the
money to be spent on foreign policy.
This too creates some problems for the Congress. By
carrying the lion's share of the burden, as the U.S. is prone
to do, the United States guarantees itself the dominant voice
in any action that the coalition might take. Despite cries of
inequality of the hardship, Congress has continually supported
Presidential-led coalitions. If the burden was so heavy, why
did Congress not lessen the load? First, the Congress, too, is
interested in national security. To reiterate Senator
Douglas's statement during the Great Debate, there is no price
tag to be placed upon national security. Second, and more
important, is that Congress clearly wants to exercise control
over the coalition. It is a different interpretation of the
Golden Rule: Whoever owns the gold, makes the rules.
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This statement raises a problem in cases like Operation
Desert Storm. Other countries provided the gold, yet the
United States still made the rules. According to one
Administration official, the U.S. had no intention of
relinquishing any of the decision making to outside
sources. 165 No other country would manipulate or blackmail
the united States with funds. The United States still
shouldered the majority of the burden and risk since the
coalition was primarily composed of American forces. Although
other nations funded the war effort, American soldiers fought
for those nations' interests as well. Thus, the relationship
between burden-sharing concerns and desire for control
remained the same.
C. POWER STRUGGLE
Finally, the attempt to build coalitions reveals the power
struggle inherent in the U.S. government. Both branches are
jealous of the other's powers and overly protective of its
own. Every check one uses against the other is seen as a
threat to the first's Constitutional power base. In reality,
however, the checks and balances are the achievements of the
Constitution, ensuring an inefficient, yet stable and
democratic, government. At no time has this truth seemed more
evident than in the collapse of Communism in the USSR.
165 Author's interviews.
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Through checks and balances, Congress has demonstrated
that it can effectively limit any Presidential "imperialism"
on the international scene. As illustrated, Congress often
times not only wants to limit Presidential action, but
determine foreign policy itself. From the troops in Europe
issue in 1951 to Operation Desert Storm, Congress constantly
attempts to shape and reshape foreign policy.
The Presidential decision to enter the burden-sharing
realm during Desert Storm could set a dangerous precedent. By
raising funds outside of the government in order to pursue
American (or executive) interests abroad, the executive branch
preempts the checks and balances of the legislative branch,
leaving the president to pursue any policy whatsoever. In
fact, Desert Storm could simply be an "overt" Iran Contra
policy. Like Iran Contra, the President solely assumed and
performed the burden-sharing responsibility.
Nevertheless, the events of Desert Storm do not support
this assertion. Desert Storm was a "public policy," with the
Congress informed at every step. Moreover, Congress still
maintained control of the appropriation process. The collected
money was placed in the Treasury, and appropriated by Congress
to the Department of Defense for Operation Desert Storm. In
fact, one could argue that the Congress will expect Desert
Storm to be the model for future coalition war. Congress could
make the President find funds for foreign policy prior to
acting in the future.
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D. THE FUTURE
Desert Storm must not come to be the accepted norm for
future coalition war; in fact, Desert Storm was more an
anomaly than a norm. The coalition was built with such speed
because of the challenge to the balance of power worldwide
and the vital oil interests in the region. Likewise, as
mentioned above, personality played an important role for the
executive branch in both the coalition building and burden-
sharing efforts. President Bush alone coordinated first the
establishment of the coalition and then the burden-sharing
drive. His dominant personality, combined with reluctant
Congressional acceptance of his actions, culminated in an
efficient grand strategic coalition and increase in
presidential power. Moreover, oil rich nations bordering on
Iraq provided fuel, bases, manpower, and, most importantly,
money. Since President Bush was able to coopt Congress by
resolving the burden-sharing issue early in the conflict, the
Persian Gulf war, all total, was not representative of
alliance and coalition war.
What does the future hold? In the light of a reduced
(almost non-existent) Soviet threat, the future of American
alliances may be dim. Congressional challenges to the utility
and expense of keeping troops abroad while the American
economy slips may aid in the collapse of American led
coalitions. Nevertheless, the United States thrives on
alliances and coalitions. The U.S. can point to NATO and claim
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its success in keeping the peace for forty years, as well as
ending the Cold War. The alliance forged in the aftermath of
World War II has proved successful.
Second, Congressional challenges to executive led foreign
policy will continue to increase. In the absence of an
external threat, activism in the Congress can spread
unchecked. With increased domestic concerns for their
constituency, calls for increased burden-sharing will
undoubtedly grow. In fact, the danger might be a return to
neo-isolationism. Some, such as Pat Buchanan, have already
made the call for "America First".
Third, in light of the above points, the president will
find an ambitious foreign policy increasingly more difficult
to enact. With a Congress reluctant to finance such policy
and, in fact, eager to determine policy itself, the President
will have to restrain emulous foreign policy objectives.
Nonetheless, coalitions will continue to play an integral
part in U.S. foreign policy. In the wake of reduced defense
budgets worldwide, collective security provides the means to
continue to meet defense requirements with diminishing
resources. In a nation eager to promote global stability, the
United States must stake its claim in coalitions and
alliances. And, as history demonstrates, the President and
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APPENDIX . . . DESERT STORM FUNDS
By the end of the Ground war, the total funds pledged
would ultimately total over 50 billion dollars, broken down in
the following 166 :
Saudi Arabia $16.84 billion
Kuwait $16.01 billion
UAE $ 4.07 billion
Germany $ 6.57 billion
Japan $10.74 billion
South Korea $ 0.39 billion
TOTAL $54.63 billion
As of July 1991, the following had been collected 167
Delivered Remaining
Saudi Arabia $11.59 $ 5.25
Kuwa i t $11.10 $ 4.91
UAE $ 4.07 $ 0.0
Germany $ 6.57 $ 0.0
Japan $ 9.43 $ 1.31
South Korea $ 0.16 $ 0.23
Again, emphasizing their voice in foreign affairs,
Congress took the leadership role in enforcing payment of the
funds. Congress must collect the funds to keep the budgetary
figure in balance. Moreover, by remaining on the attack,
Congress can remain in the limelight. This is vitally
166 Critics cited war pledges of $54 billion but
Congressional appropriations of only $43 billion, implying an
$11 billion surplus. Germany asked for a specific accounting
of war costs before they made their final payments. "War Costs
Bill Passes Easily; Allied Pledges Emphasized, " Congressional
Quarterly , March 23, 1991, p. 762.
167 Defense 91 Almanac
,
(Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, September/October, 1991), p. 59.
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important in view of the President's high popularity rating
and Congress's low rating. As the pendulum of power swings
gradually towards the President, only by remaining on the
offensive can Congress hope to regain some of that power and
popularity back.
Congress's tool to collect the funds promised is approval
(or denial) of arms sales. Currently, Congress has stymied
arms sales to the pledging nations until they pay off their
debt, and all six of the nations plan to buy U.S. weapons in
1991. The rationale is, if the Saudis have the money to buy
weapons, they surely have the money to first pay off their
debt. Senator Mark Hatfield summed up Congressional attitudes:
"They have the capability to make good on their pledges and
it's not going to cause one Saudi to go hungry." 168
Reiteration of Congress's role in foreign policy is
necessary. By playing "bad cop" or "tax collector", they 1)
keep their foot in the door of foreign affairs; 2) enable the
president to accomplish an agenda of his own; and 3) realize
the collection of funds, a bipartisan goal relieving the
burden of the Persian Gulf Crisis.
168 .. B i]_]_ Holds Gun at Debtors' Heads," Washington Times
,
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